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A CASE FOR INCLUDING ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN 
THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS 
ACT 1990 
Joss Opie* 
Economic, social and cultural rights are fundamental human rights, but New Zealand domestic law 
does not recognise them as such. This article discusses some of the difficulties this omission creates 
for the protection of these rights, and critiques the reasons for not including them in the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. It argues that economic, social and cultural rights should have the 
same legal status in New Zealand as civil and political rights: that is, justiciable rights which are 
also directly relevant to statutory interpretation, and law and policy-making. 
I INTRODUCTION 
When the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) was enacted, economic, social and 
cultural rights (ESCR) were intentionally omitted from it. As a result, New Zealand domestic law 
does not recognise ESCR as freestanding, justiciable rights, and they have an unequal legal status to 
the civil and political rights (CPR) affirmed in the NZBORA. In this article, I argue that there is a 
need for greater legal protection for ESCR in New Zealand, and that the reasons which have been 
offered for denying ESCR an equal status to CPR are unconvincing. Accordingly, these rights 
should be incorporated into the NZBORA.1  
  
*  Joss Opie is a Senior Associate at Buddle Findlay Lawyers, Wellington. He holds a BA/LLB from Victoria 
University of Wellington and a LLM from the University of Toronto. This article is written in his personal 
capacity. He would like to thank Professor Bill Atkin, Dr Brian Opie, and an anonymous reviewer for their 
insightful and helpful comments on earlier drafts. Any errors or omissions are his. 
1  For a more comprehensive analysis of the issues discussed in this article, together with comparative studies 
of the economic, social and cultural rights [ESCR] recognised in the Brazilian, South African and Finnish 
Constitutions and a version of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 [NZBORA] amended to include a 
series of ESCR, see Joss Opie "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in New Zealand: Their Current Status 
and the Need for Change" (LLM Thesis, University of Toronto, 2010) University of Toronto Research 
Repository <https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca>.  
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For the purposes of this article, I define ESCR as the rights and corresponding obligations in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR or the Covenant).2 These 
rights and obligations are binding on New Zealand under international law, as it is a State party to 
the Covenant.3 
In Part II, I briefly summarise the principal ESCR. In Part III, I set out the reasons that ESCR 
were left out of the NZBORA and describe the differences in the domestic legal status of CPR and 
ESCR as a result of this omission. In Parts IV and V, I argue that the omission is significant, with 
reference to the regressive effects the social and economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s had on 
people's enjoyment of ESCR, and the lack of any real ability to test the policies implemented as part 
of these reforms against human rights standards. In this regard, I also summarise and critique a 1996 
High Court judgment, Lawson v Housing New Zealand,4 to demonstrate the effect of rights such as 
the right to adequate housing not being recognised in domestic law, and to provide an example of 
the type of inquiry New Zealand courts could engage in if ESCR were justiciable. In Part VI, I 
critique the reasons for leaving ESCR out of the NZBORA. 
II ESCR 
The ICESCR includes a broad range of rights and obligations. They are principally as follows. 
A Covenant Rights 
These rights include the right to freedom from discrimination in the exercise of the rights set out 
in the ICESCR;5 the equal right of men and women to enjoy the Covenant rights;6 the right to 
work;7 certain trade union rights;8 the right to social security;9 the right to an adequate standard of 
  
2  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 993 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 19 
December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) [ICESCR or the Covenant]. 
3  New Zealand ratified the ICESCR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (999 UNTS 
171 (opened for signature 19 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) [ICCPR]) on 28 December 
1978. 
4  Lawson v Housing New Zealand [1997] 2 NZLR 474 (HC) [Lawson v HNZ]. 
5  Article 2(2).  
6  Article 3. 
7  Articles 6 and 7. This right includes a right "of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which 
he freely chooses or accepts", and a corresponding obligation on States parties to safeguard this right (for 
example, by providing protection against unfair deprivations of work, such as unjustifiable dismissal); and a 
right to "the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work", such as remuneration sufficient to 
provide all workers with "a decent living for themselves and their families", safe and healthy working 
conditions, and paid holidays. As the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
[CESCR] states in General Comment No 18 E/C.12/GC/18 (2006) at [6], the right does not include "an 
absolute and unconditional right to obtain employment." 
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living, including adequate food, clothing and housing;10 the right to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health;11 the right to education;12 and various cultural 
and intellectual property rights.13 In addition, in art 10 the States parties recognise that "[t]he widest 
possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family"; "[s]pecial protection should be 
accorded" to mothers for a period before and after childbirth; and "special measures of protection 
and assistance should be taken on behalf of" children and young persons. 
B State Party Obligations 
1 Progressive realisation and unjustifiable retrogressive measures 
States parties do not have to guarantee most of the Covenant rights immediately and in full.14 
Instead, they undertake to take steps, to the maximum of their available resources,15 to realise 
progressively rights such as the right to social security or the right to adequate housing, until full 
realisation is achieved.16  
  
8  Article 8. These include the right of everyone to form trade unions and join a trade union of his or her 
choice, and the right to strike. 
9  Article 9. 
10  Article 11. 
11  Article 12.  
12  Article 13. This right includes an obligation on States parties to provide free primary education, and to 
introduce progressively free secondary and tertiary education. 
13  Article 15. 
14  ICESCR, art 2(1). There is a distinction in the Covenant between rights which States parties "recognize", 
such as the right to education, and rights which States parties "undertake to guarantee" or "undertake to 
ensure". The obligation of progressive realisation in art 2(1) applies to "recognized" rights, while all other 
rights which do not come within that category must be guaranteed immediately and in full. The latter rights 
include the right of self-determination in art 1; the art 2(2) guarantee of non-discrimination; the undertaking 
in art 2(3) "to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment" of the rights set out in the 
Covenant; and the undertaking to ensure the trade union rights set out in art 8. See Matthew CR Craven The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) at 134; Michael J Dennis and David P Stewart "Justiciability of Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the 
Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?" (2004) 98 AJIL 462 at fn 158; and CESCR General 
Comment No 3 E/1991/23 (1990) at [1] and [2]. 
15  For an analysis of the nature of this obligation, see CESCR An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to 
the "Maximum of Available Resources" Under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant E/C.12/2007/1 (2007). 
16  For an analysis of the meaning of "full realization", see Opie, above n 1, at 13–15. A State party that 
achieves full realisation of one or all of the recognised rights will continue to have duties under the 
Covenant. Principal amongst these will be the duties to respect and protect the right(s), not to retrogress 
unjustifiably and not to introduce unjustifiable limitations. 
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The flipside of the duty of progressive realisation is the obligation not to take unjustifiable 
retrogressive measures (that is, measures which reduce the extent to which a right is enjoyed within 
a State party's jurisdiction), and otherwise not to limit unjustifiably the enjoyment of a Covenant 
right.17 Subject to justifiable retrogression and maximum available resources, and until full 
realisation is achieved, States parties are required to improve "conditions over time without 
backward movement of any kind – in what may be described as a form of 'ratchet effect'."18 
Pursuant to art 4 of the Covenant, a retrogressive measure will be unjustifiable unless it is 
determined by law, compatible with the nature of the right in question, and is for the purpose of 
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. A retrogressive measure will also be 
unjustifiable unless the responsible State party can show that before adopting the measure it 
comprehensively examined all alternatives.19 The State party must also show that the measure is 
proportionate, meaning "that the least restrictive measures must be adopted when several types of 
limitations may be imposed."20 
Accordingly, a State party will breach the Covenant if it postpones full realisation of the 
Covenant rights indefinitely (for example, by taking one step forward, and two steps backwards), 
arbitrarily reduces the level at which ESCR are enjoyed in that State's jurisdiction, or limits the 
rights in a way which renders them meaningless.21 
2 Domestic legal recognition of ESCR 
The ICESCR does not oblige States parties to incorporate its provisions into domestic law or 
give the rights it recognises any particular legal status.22 However, as the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)23 has stated, "in many instances 
  
17  These obligations are derived from arts 2(1) and 4 of the Covenant. For an analysis of the relationship 
between these articles, see Opie, above n 1, at 16–21. Limitations or retrogressions affecting the rights in 
arts 8(1)(a) and 8(1)(c) are excluded from the ambit of art 4 because those rights have their own specific 
limitations provisions. 
18  Craven, above n 14, at 131. 
19  CESCR General Comment No 19 E/C.12/GC/19 (2008) at [42]. 
20  CESCR General Comment No 17 E/C.12/GC/17 (2006) at [23]. 
21  For further examples of the ways in which States parties may violate their obligations under the Covenant, 
see the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights E/C.12/2000/13 
(2000) at [14] and [15]; CESCR General Comment No 12 E/C.12/1999/5 (1999) at [19]; CESCR General 
Comment No 13 E/C.12/1999/10 (1999) at [59]; CESCR General Comment No 14 E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) at 
[46]–[52]; and CESCR General Comment No 19, above n 19, at [64] and [65]. 
22  Article 2(1) and CESCR General Comment No 9 E/C.12/1998/24 (1998) at [5]. 
23  The CESCR was established to assist the United Nations Economic and Social Council in monitoring State 
party compliance with ICESCR obligations: see Philip Alston "Out of the Abyss: The Challenges 
Confronting the New UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1987) 9 Hum Rts Q 332. 
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legislation is highly desirable and in some cases may even be indispensable".24 Generally, 
"whenever a Covenant right cannot be made fully effective without some role for the judiciary, 
judicial remedies are necessary."25  
Further, while States parties have a discretion as to how they recognise ESCR in national law, 
"the means used should be appropriate in the sense of producing results which are consistent with 
the full discharge of its obligations by the State party".26 In deciding on how (or whether) to give 
the Covenant effect in domestic law, a State party should take account:27  
… of the means which have proved to be most effective in the country concerned in ensuring the 
protection of other human rights. Where the means used to give effect to the Covenant … differ 
significantly from those used in relation to other human rights treaties, there should be a compelling 
justification for this. 
III WHY ESCR WERE LEFT OUT OF THE NZBORA AND THEIR 
UNEQUAL STATUS IN NEW ZEALAND LAW 
A The Reasons for Omitting ESCR from the NZBORA 
The NZBORA was enacted in 1990, five years after Geoffrey Palmer (then the Minister of 
Justice and Attorney-General) presented a document entitled "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: a 
White Paper" (White Paper) to Parliament.28 In the White Paper, which included a draft Bill, the 
recently elected Labour Government explained what it considered the Bill would do and why New 
Zealand needed it.  
The central reasons advanced for the Bill were that fundamental rights and freedoms were 
insufficiently protected in New Zealand, particularly because of the lack of a written Constitution 
and of a second House of Parliament. It was argued that the Bill would guarantee these rights and 
freedoms and restrain the abuse of governmental power. The Bill would also educate New 
  
24  CESCR General Comment No 3, above n 14, at [3]. In subsequent General Comments the CESCR has 
elaborated on this point and provided examples of certain rights or elements of those rights which it 
considers cannot be adequately protected in the absence of legislation. These include the right not to be 
arbitrarily evicted from one's home (an element of the right to housing) (CESCR General Comment No 7 
E/1998/22 (1997) at [9]) and the right to work (CESCR General Comment No 18, above n 7, at [25]). 
25  CESCR General Comment No 9, above n 22, at [9]. 
26  Ibid, at [5]. See also CESCR General Comment No 3, above n 14, at [5], where the CESCR "notes, for 
example, that the enjoyment of the rights recognized, without discrimination, will often be appropriately 
promoted, in part, through the provision of judicial or other effective remedies." 
27  CESCR General Comment No 9, above n 22, at [7]. 
28  Geoffrey Palmer "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper" [1984–1985] 1 AJHR A6 ["White 
Paper"].  
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Zealanders about fundamental freedoms and be a source of inspiration.29 As proposed, the Bill was 
to have supreme law status and courts would have had the power under it to strike down 
legislation.30  
While the Bill's preamble referred to New Zealand's ratification of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),31 there was no reference to the ICESCR, and ESCR were 
intentionally omitted from the Bill.32 The reasons given for this in the White Paper were that while 
the Bill should "capture and protect the continuing essence of our constitutional and political 
system", it should not "attempt to capture (or more accurately to impose) a temporarily popular view 
of policy."33 CPR were seen as "value free", but ESCR were characterised as an attempt to "freeze 
into a special constitutional status substantive economic and social policies."34  
Further, the CPR in the Bill were said to be "principally negative rights in that they impose a 
duty on the State to refrain from infringing them", as opposed to imposing "positive obligations on 
the State to do something."35 Accordingly, courts would be able to enforce these rights. The positive 
nature of ESCR, on the other hand, meant that such rights were unenforceable.36 ESCR were 
instead "given effect to through other legislative and administrative action."37 
After its presentation in Parliament, the Bill was referred to the Justice and Law Reform Select 
Committee. In its final report, the Committee stated that a significant majority of the submissions it 
had received on the Bill were opposed to it being enacted as supreme law, on the basis that this 
  
29  Ibid, at 5. 
30  Ibid, at 5 and 6. 
31  As Palmer "White Paper", above n 28 stated at [10.10], "[t]he Bill of Rights does not incorporate or enact 
the Covenant but its provisions are consistent with it." 
32  The NZBORA does affirm the right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds set out in the Human 
Rights Act 1993 [HRA] (s 19), the right to freedom of association (s 17) and certain minority rights (s 20). 
These rights can also be characterised as ESCR. However, they were included on the basis that they were 
civil and political rights [CPR]. 
33  Palmer "White Paper", above n 28, at [3.14]. 
34  Ibid, at [4.14]. This quotation is taken from the discussion in the White Paper regarding the Bill's role in 
"enhancing accountable and democratic government." There is no express reference to ESCR in this section, 
but taken with the earlier characterisation of ESCR as imposing "a temporary popular view of policy", the 
contrast being made in this section appears to be between CPR, which are defined as value-free with respect 
to economic and social policy, and ESCR, which are defined as attempting to lock in certain policies. 
Paragraph [4.14] is also cited in [4.28] as being one of the paragraphs of the White Paper that provides the 
reasons for not including "economic rights" in the Bill. 
35  Palmer "White Paper", above n 28, at [10.179]. 
36  Ibid. 
37  Ibid. 
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would transfer too much power to unelected judges.38 Accordingly, while the Committee supported 
the concept of a Bill of Rights, it recommended that the Bill be enacted as an ordinary statute. 
The Committee further stated:39 
[F]undamental social and economic rights … are obviously as important to New Zealanders as the civil 
and political rights in the White Paper draft … . However, there are great difficulties in dealing with 
such rights in a judicially enforceable supreme law such as the White Paper draft. With a bill that is not 
judicially enforceable there are much fewer problems … . In Appendix A the Committee suggests that 
some of these major specified rights could be included. It is recognised that effective exercise of civil 
and political rights depends on securing an adequate standard of living, housing, health care and 
education.  
While the Committee's recommendation that the Bill be enacted as an ordinary statute was 
ultimately accepted, the recommendation regarding ESCR was not. In Parliament, Palmer explained 
that this was because ESCR were in "a different category from civil and political rights": as in the 
White Paper, CPR were said to be concerned with restraining State power, while ESCR apparently 
  
38  Justice and Law Reform Committee "Final Report of the Justice and Law Reform Committee on a White 
Paper on A Bill of Rights for New Zealand" [1988] AJHR I.8c at 2–3 ["Justice and Law Reform Committee 
Final Report"]. 
39  Ibid, at 4. The ESCR which the Committee suggested could be included were the right to an adequate 
standard of living, including food, housing and health care; the right to work; the right to education; the 
right to own property; and the right to participate in the cultural life of the community (at 10). It is not 
entirely clear, however, what status the Committee envisaged ESCR as having. It appears that the 
Committee considered that such rights would be more in the nature of directive principles, or that while 
ESCR could be justiciable to some degree, they would not have the same status as CPR. This is because 
while the excerpt from the Committee's report quoted above seems to suggest that the ESCR it 
recommended be included in the Bill would have an equal status to CPR, other sections from the report 
indicate otherwise. For example, in discussing what became the interpretative direction in s 6 of the 
NZBORA, the Committee only stated (at 10) that "[t]he Bill could include a provision … directing that the 
interpretation of an enactment consistent with the civil and political rights in the bill is to be preferred … ." 
(emphasis added). The same distinction is made in the Committee's reference to the Attorney-General's 
responsibility to report on Bills inconsistent with the NZBORA: once again, there is an express reference to 
CPR only. This is despite the fact that the Committee recommended (at 5) that a reference to "social and 
economic rights" be included in the preamble to the Bill. However, the Committee also recommended (at 
11) that a "Parliamentary select committee" be established "to examine bill of rights matters." It envisaged 
this select committee as having jurisdiction to review and report to Parliament not only on Bills but also on 
enactments that it considered to be inconsistent "with any of the rights in the bill" (that is, either CPR or 
ESCR) (emphasis added). The select committee would have had jurisdiction to carry out its review powers 
in respect of enactments either at "its own initiative or on receipt of a written complaint from a member of 
the public." It is not clear whether the Committee considered that the courts would have jurisdiction to 
adjudicate upon cases alleging ESCR breach.  
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were not. Palmer also stated that the non-inclusion of ESCR did not mean that such rights were less 
important, "but, rather, that they should be protected in a different way."40  
In a book published in 1992, Palmer (who was by then Sir Geoffrey, having been knighted in 
1991) stated that Caucus had vigorously debated the Committee's recommendation on ESCR, but 
that he:41 
 … successfully opposed such matters being included in the legislation because it would suggest such 
matters may be capable of judicial resolution. To broaden a Bill of Rights so that it encompassed such 
broad policy questions would have made it unmanageable in my view and opened it up to ridicule. It 
also seemed to me that to state as fundamental rights matters which it was not within the power of 
government to deliver would cause expectations to rise, only to be dashed. I do not doubt it should be 
the aim of the political system to deliver such things as far as practicable. I cannot see that in areas of 
policy quasi-legal guarantees help in the delivery. 
Much later (in a paper he delivered in 2006),42 Palmer referred to an argument in favour of 
extending the NZBORA to include ESCR.43 He stated that South Africa was the principal model for 
such an approach, described some of the ways in which ESCR are recognised under the South 
African Constitution, and noted two of the South African Constitutional Court's leading ESCR 
judgments.44 Referring to those judgments as "bold", Palmer argued that such "judicial 
encroachment" into the prerogatives of the executive and legislature would be unacceptable in New 
Zealand, and that New Zealand's judges did not have the requisite "background or capacities" to 
adjudicate on "social policy". He considered that such issues were "best left to politics".45 
  
40  (10 October 1989) 502 NZPD 13040.  
41  Geoffrey Palmer New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis: Reforming Our Political System (John McIndoe, 
Dunedin, 1992) at 57 [New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis]. 
42  Geoffrey Palmer "The Bill of Rights Fifteen Years On" (Keynote Speech for the Ministry of Justice 
Symposium on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, Wellington, 10 February 2006) at [28]–[29] ["The 
Bill of Rights Fifteen Years On"]. 
43  See John Smillie "Who Wants Juristocracy?" (2006) 11 Otago L Rev 183 at 193–195. 
44  Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) [2002] 10 B Const LR 1033 
(SA Const Ct) and Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom and Others [2000] 11 B Const 
LR 1169 (SA Const Ct). 
45  Palmer "The Bill of Rights Fifteen Years On", above n 42, at [27]–[29]. 
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B The Unequal Status of CPR and ESCR in Domestic Law 
1 CPR 
As set out above, Parliament's intention in enacting the NZBORA was to give greater protection 
to CPR in New Zealand. Although the NZBORA is not supreme law, this objective has been 
achieved to a degree. 
Importantly, the CPR affirmed in the NZBORA are directly relevant to statutory interpretation 
and law-making. Section 6 of the NZBORA provides that legislation must be interpreted 
consistently with the NZBORA where possible. Further, as well as the requirement in the Cabinet 
Manual that the rights in the NZBORA be considered during the legislative process,46 s 7 of the 
NZBORA imposes a duty on the Attorney-General to report to Parliament where a Bill appears to 
be inconsistent with the NZBORA. As a result, the Ministry of Justice screens all proposed 
legislation for consistency with the CPR affirmed in the NZBORA.47 
In addition, the rights in the NZBORA are justiciable. As well as having jurisdiction to award 
damages for breach of those rights and other remedies such as declarations,48 the courts may 
indicate that an ordinary enactment is inconsistent with the NZBORA. Such an indication does not 
require Parliament to remedy the inconsistency or give rise to a right to relief, but may be seen as 
imposing an obligation (of a political or moral nature) on Parliament to reconsider the legislation in 
question and justify any decision not to rectify it.49 
  
46  See Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2008 at [7.60], which states that when a Minister seeks to include a Bill 
in the legislative programme of government, he or she must draw attention to any aspects of the Bill that 
may have implications for, or affect the rights in, the NZBORA, the HRA, or "international obligations". 
Further, when a Bill is submitted to the Cabinet Legislation Committee for approval for introduction to the 
House of Representatives, the Minister responsible must confirm that amongst other matters the Bill 
complies with the rights in the NZBORA and the HRA (at [7.61]). 
47  Ibid, at [7.62]. 
48  See Simpson v Attorney-General [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA) and Taunoa v Attorney-General [2007] NZSC 
70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429 [Taunoa]. There is no express remedies provision in the NZBORA. However, the 
courts have found they have an implicit jurisdiction to grant "appropriate and effective remedies where 
rights have been infringed" (see in this regard and for example Taunoa at [106]). 
49  See, for example, Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1 at [259], where McGrath J states:  
As a result, it is to be expected that New Zealand courts from time to time will be 
constitutionally bound, applying s 4 of the Bill of Rights Act, to give effect to legislation 
which they have concluded is not capable of being read consistently with the Bill of Rights. 
In such instances it is the constitutional responsibility of the court to indicate in its judgment 
that it has relied on s 4 of the Bill of Rights Act to uphold an inconsistent provision in 
another statute. Other branches of government are under no obligation to change the law to 
remedy the inconsistency, but it may be expected that there will be a reconsideration by 
them of the inconsistent legislation.  
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Proceedings under the Human Rights Act 1993 (HRA)50 may also be brought before the Human 
Rights Review Tribunal (HRRT)51 alleging that a public act, omission or enactment is inconsistent 
with the NZBORA's right to freedom from discrimination. If the HRRT finds an inconsistency, it 
may grant various remedies including damages (other than when the inconsistency arises as a result 
of an enactment).52 In the case of an enactment, the HRRT may only make a declaration of 
inconsistency.53 Such a declaration does not bind the Government, but the declaration must be 
reported to Parliament, along with advice on how the Government intends to respond to the 
declaration.54  
2 The NZBORA's effect 
Various commentators consider that the NZBORA has had not only an important impact in CPR 
cases, statutory interpretation and law-making, but also on policy.55 Palmer has contended that the 
statute has been "a set of navigation lights for the whole process of government to observe", and that 
it has led to more principled governance in New Zealand.56  
  
See also Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA) at 17 per Tipping J. For a 
discussion of these "indications" and whether the courts have an implied jurisdiction under the NZBORA to 
issue a formal declaration of inconsistency (as opposed to simply indicating such inconsistency), see 
Claudia Geiringer "On a Road to Nowhere: Implied Declarations of Inconsistency and the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act" (2009) 40 VUWLR 613.  
50  As the title to the HRA states, its purpose is to "consolidate and amend the Race Relations Act 1971 and the 
Human Rights Commission Act 1977 and to provide better protection of human rights in New Zealand in 
general accordance with United Nations Covenants or Conventions on Human Rights." 
51  The HRRT is a first instance, semi-judicial tribunal continued by s 93 of the HRA. 
52  HRA, s 92I. 
53  Ibid, s 92J. 
54  Ibid, s 92K. 
55  See Palmer "The Bill of Rights Fifteen Years On", above n 42, at [14]–[20]; Andrew Butler and Petra Butler 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005) at ch 35; and Ivor 
Richardson "The New Zealand Bill of Rights: Experience and Potential, Including the Implications for 
Commerce" (2004) 10 Canterbury L Rev 259 at 262. For a contrary view in some respects, see Andrew 
Geddis "The Comparative Irrelevance of the NZBORA to Legislative Practice" (2009) 23 NZULR 465. 
Geddis, however, states at 469 that he accepts that the NZBORA has had an impact on diverse fields of New 
Zealand's law. Further, while Geddis states at 472 that it is "impossible to measure just how much of an 
impact the NZBORA vetting process actually has on the creation of the government's legislative proposals" 
as the development of government Bills "takes place inside something of a black box", he accepts that "it 
seems likely that the government will decide against bringing some legislative proposals before Parliament 
after being advised that they are NZBORA inconsistent." 
56  Palmer "The Bill of Rights Fifteen Years On", above n 42, at [38]. 
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In addition, the justiciability of the rights in the NZBORA (and HRA) has allowed the judiciary 
to apply them in concrete cases, and at the same time explain what those rights mean in the New 
Zealand context. This must have led to a greater understanding of those rights in New Zealand and 
to CPR having a higher profile in New Zealand than would otherwise have been the case. 
3 ESCR's Lesser Status 
(a)  Consequences of the omission of ESCR from the NZBORA 
Unlike CPR, in New Zealand domestic law there are no free-standing, generally justiciable 
ESCR. New Zealand law does not oblige the State to realise ESCR progressively, and it does not 
prohibit unjustifiable retrogressive measures in respect of ESCR or other unjustifiable limitations 
(other than limitations concerning the right to freedom from discrimination and of association, and 
the rights of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, and then only to the extent provided for in 
the NZBORA and HRA).   
The courts' jurisdiction under the NZBORA to declare that public action is inconsistent with the 
rights affirmed in the NZBORA, and to indicate legislative inconsistency, does not extend to ESCR 
such as the right to health or the right to social security. The same applies to the HRRT's jurisdiction 
under the HRA, including its power to declare that an enactment is inconsistent with the NZBORA's 
right to freedom from discrimination. 
Consequently, whether a certain law, policy or other public action has violated an individual's 
ESCR is justiciable domestically to a significantly lesser extent than alleged breaches of an 
individual's CPR.57 
It also follows that because ESCR are not generally included in the NZBORA or the HRA, they 
have a much lesser effect on statutory interpretation, law-making, and policy than they otherwise 
would. For example, because the NZBORA does not affirm ESCR, those rights fall outside of the s 
6 obligation to interpret statutes consistently with the NZBORA's rights where possible; and outside 
of the review that the Attorney-General conducts of each Bill in order to comply with s 7 of the 
NZBORA. Further, while the Cabinet Manual requires that Ministers identify potential 
inconsistencies between Bills and "international obligations"58 (which include New Zealand's 
obligations under the ICESCR), there is little evidence that proposed legislation is analysed for 
compliance with ESCR.59 
  
57  See also Claudia Geiringer and Matthew Palmer "Human Rights and Social Policy in New Zealand" (2007) 
30 Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 12 at 37, who state that "it is clear that as a general proposition, 
[ESCR] currently receive substantially less judicial protection in New Zealand than do [CPR]." 
58  Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual, above n 46, at [7.60(d)]. 
59  See Geiringer and Palmer, above n 57, at 33, who state:  
482 (2012) 43 VUWLR 
(b)  Recognition of aspects of ESCR: legislation and common law 
This is not to say that New Zealand legislation does not recognise ESCR at all. For example, the 
Minimum Wage Act 1983, the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, the Employment 
Relations Act 2000 and the Holidays Act 2003 protect elements of the right to work and the right to 
the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work. Legislation such as the New Zealand 
Public Health and Disability Act 2000 and the Accident Compensation Act 2001 promote the right 
to health (by, for example, providing for the public funding and provision of health and disability 
support services, and for compensation and other entitlements for specified personal injuries). 
Statutes such as the Housing Corporation Act 1974, the Housing Restructuring and Tenancy Matters 
Act 1992 and the Social Security Act 1964 are relevant to the right to an adequate standard of living 
(including the right to adequate housing) and the right to social security.  
Also, aspects of the rights or entitlements that those and other statutes establish are justiciable in 
New Zealand courts.60 For example, an employee who alleges that he or she has been unjustifiably 
dismissed, disadvantaged or discriminated against may sue in the Employment Relations Authority 
or the Employment Court61 (or under the HRA in relation to discrimination, as discussed above) for 
a series of remedies including compensation. A person who alleges that he or she has not received 
an entitlement under the Accident Compensation Act in relation to a covered personal injury may 
appeal to the District Court (and subsequently to higher courts).62 In addition, the HRRT's 
jurisdiction referred to above in respect of the right to freedom from discrimination provides an 
indirect route for litigating ESCR.63 
  
By requiring legislative proposals to confirm compliance with 'international obligations', 
[this mechanism] does have the potential to facilitate consideration of [ESCR]. Again, 
although further study is required, we suspect that this mechanism is not routinely used to 
analyse the implications of legislative proposals for [ESCR]. 
60  See also Geiringer and Palmer, above n 57, at 36, who state: "[t]he New Zealand statute books contain 
countless examples of the courts and/or quasi-judicial bodies being expressly empowered to protect and 
enforce specific aspects of [ESCR]." See further New Zealand's third periodic report under the ICESCR 
(Third periodic report submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: New Zealand 
E/C.12/NZL/3 (2009) at [22]–[27]). 
61  Employment Relations Act 2000, pt 9. 
62  Accident Compensation Act 2001, pt 5. This right of appeal arises after a less formal review process of a 
decision to decline a claim for an entitlement has been conducted. 
63  See, for example, Child Poverty Action Group Incorporated v Attorney-General HC Wellington CIV-2009-
404-273, 25 October 2011 [CPAG v AG]. In these proceedings, the Child Poverty Action Group sought a 
declaration that legislation providing for certain tax credits as part of a "Working for Families" (WFF) 
policy initiative gave rise to discrimination on the ground of employment status against people on income 
tested benefits (who were ineligible for the credits). While this case could be characterised as simply 
concerning a CPR, being the right to freedom from discrimination, it also concerns ESCR, such as the right 
to social security, the right to an adequate standard of living and the Covenant's own prohibition of 
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Further, the common law provides certain means by which New Zealand's obligations under the 
ICESCR may be given some effect in domestic law. One of these is the administrative law 
requirement that decision-makers exercising a statutory power of decision take into account all 
relevant considerations. Where decisions which affect ESCR are being made, the obligations set out 
in the Covenant are likely to be such considerations. The requirement to take these obligations into 
account may influence decision-making, and a failure to do so by a decision-maker may provide 
grounds for challenging his or her decision. Also, the common law presumption of statutory 
construction that, where possible, statutes should be interpreted consistently with New Zealand's 
international obligations, could be relied upon to argue in favour of ESCR-consistent interpretations 
of legislation which affect these rights. In Part VI below, I analyse these two mechanisms in more 
detail. 
However, the legislative recognition of aspects of ESCR referred to above is piecemeal. Also, 
for the reasons set out in Part VI, any additional protection that the common law mechanisms may 
provide for ESCR is likely to be limited, and in any case is indirect. The critical difference between 
CPR and ESCR in New Zealand domestic law is that the law does not recognise ESCR themselves 
as fundamental, justiciable rights. As Geiringer and Palmer state, "[w]hat the New Zealand courts 
lack is the ability to test state and/or private action against broad [ESCR] protections".64 
  
discrimination. The High Court held that the WFF initiative did not subject the vast majority of beneficiaries 
to any prohibited discrimination (and that even if it did, such discrimination was justified in terms of s 5 of 
the NZBORA). It also held that while a subset of beneficiaries were discriminated against as a result of the 
WFF initiative, that discrimination was justifiable. See also Ministry of Health v Atkinson (2010) 9 HRNZ 
47 (HC), in which the High Court dismissed the Ministry's appeal against a HRRT declaration that the 
Ministry's practice of excluding specified family members from payment for the provision of funded 
disability support was inconsistent with the right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of family 
status; and was not a justified limitation of that right in terms of s 5 of the NZBORA. This judgment has 
since been affirmed by the Court of Appeal: Ministry of Health v Atkinson [2012] NZCA 184.  
64  Geiringer and Palmer, above n 57, at 36. See also Butler and Butler, above n 55, who note at [35.12.4]:  
Since the enactment of [the NZBORA], there has been continued pressure by interested 
persons and organisations to secure the inclusion of at least some [ESCR] in BORA or some 
other free-standing legislation.  
The authors further note a submission by the New Zealand Human Rights Commission to the Constitutional 
Arrangements Committee [CAC] in 2005 recommending amongst other matters that the CAC investigate 
"the examples provided by overseas constitutions for the inclusion of [ESCR] in any future constitutional 
document". As the authors state, however, the CAC "did not specifically pick up this recommendation." 
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C Do These Differences Matter? 
Accordingly, Parliament has intentionally given ESCR a lesser legal status than CPR. But does 
this matter? The Government's position is that it does not: in its view, ESCR are adequately 
protected by other means.65 In the next two Parts, I argue that this view is incorrect. 
IV SOCIAL REVOLUTION AND APPARENT ESCR VIOLATIONS 
As stated above, the NZBORA was promoted on the basis that CPR were insufficiently 
protected in New Zealand. However, there was no fear when the White Paper was presented to 
Parliament in 1985 that CPR were in significant danger. The White Paper stated that "[n]o 
Government and no Parliament we are likely to have in New Zealand in the foreseeable future are 
going to attempt to sweep away basic rights."66 Instead, it was argued that there was a need to 
protect against incremental erosion of CPR and to put in place "safe systems" before any emergency 
arose.67 
It was no doubt correct in 1985 that CPR were not under any real threat in New Zealand. The 
same could not be said for ESCR.  
  
65  See, for example, New Zealand's initial periodic report under the Covenant (Initial reports submitted by 
States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: New Zealand E/1990/5/Add.5 (1991) at [6]), in 
which New Zealand advised that:  
After discussion of the issues involved, it was decided not to extend the terms of the 
proposed Bill [for the NZBORA] to include social and economic rights. The enjoyment of 
these rights, it was felt, is already adequately protected under the wide range of specific laws 
by which the Government is committed to positive action for their promotion. 
See also Second periodic reports by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: New Zealand 
E/1990/6/Add.33 (2001) at [48(a)], which states:  
The Government decided against the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights in the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the basis that such rights are implemented through 
other legislation and administration, and the common law.   
… 
[I]t is considered that the present systems in New Zealand provide an appropriate level of 
protection to fulfil, in practice, New Zealand's obligations under the Covenant. 
66  Palmer "White Paper", above n 28, at [4.8]. The parliamentary debates on the Bill also reflect this 
sentiment: see for example (10 October 1989) 502 NZPD 13050–13051. 
67  Palmer "White Paper", above n 28, at [4.10] and [4.24]. 
 A CASE FOR INCLUDING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990 485 
 
 
A The Social Revolution 
On 11 June 1984, the Labour Party was elected to Government, replacing the National 
Government then in power.68 At the time, public sector debt, inflation and unemployment were all 
rising in New Zealand, and a currency crisis created additional instability.69 Changes in economic 
and social policy were necessary.  
The Labour Government, however, went well beyond moderate reform. Instead, it carried out 
radical neoliberal70 reforms of New Zealand's State institutions and its economy, at great speed.71 
The National Government continued this agenda following its election in 1990. In 1993, The 
Economist described these reforms as "more radical than any other industrial country's".72 In New 
Zealand, the period was referred to by some as one of revolution.73 
B Retrogressive Reforms 
At the time, and now, there was considerable debate about whether such drastic reforms were 
required and would be (or have been) beneficial in the long term. However, it seems clear that the 
reforms were retrogressive in terms of the extent to which ESCR were realised in New Zealand in 
1984 in relation to, for example, the rights to work, to social security, to an adequate standard of 
living including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to education. The following statistics 
(which are not exhaustive by any means) evidence this retrogression.74  
  
68  The Labour party had traditionally been a progressive, left-leaning party. National was traditionally 
conservative and right-leaning. 
69  Jane Kelsey The New Zealand Experiment: a World Model for Structural Adjustment? (Auckland 
University Press, Auckland, 1997) at 24 and 29–30. See also Paul Dalziel "National's Macroeconomic 
Policy" in Jonathan Boston and Paul Dalziel (eds) The Decent Society? Essays in Response to National's 
Economic and Social Policies (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1992) 19 at 20. 
70  Kelsey, above n 69, at 2, describes the reform agenda as being based around the fundamentals of "market 
liberalisation and free trade, limited government, a narrow monetarist policy, a deregulated labour market, 
and fiscal restraint". 
71  Ibid, at 33. See also Tim Hazledine and John Quiggan "No More Free Beer Tomorrow? Economic Policy 
and Outcomes in Australia and New Zealand since 1984" (2006) 41 Australian Journal of Political Science 
145 at 152, who state:  
The speed with which the reform program was implemented is truly astounding. Of the 104 
reforms listed by Bollard, Lattimore and Silverstone (1996) between 1984 and 1991, 65 were 
completed or well underway by the end of 1988. 
72  The Economist (16 October 1993) at 20, cited in Kelsey, above n 69, at 8. 
73  Kelsey, above n 69, at 323. See also Hazledine and Quiggan, above n 71, at 152. 
74  For a full account, see Kelsey, above n 69. See also the Concluding observations of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: New Zealand E/C.12/1993/13 (1994) at [11], where the CESCR 
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In the 1960s, full employment was "the central plank of economic and social policy." 75 
However, after 1984, "the goal of full paid employment … was treated by policymakers as 
unattainable, unaffordable and undesirable."76 Unemployment in the general population, seen as the 
natural consequence of a dynamic economy,77 rose from 3.8 per cent in 1985 to 7.7 per cent in 1990 
and to 11.1 per cent in 1991.78  
Figures for Māori and Pacific Islanders were much worse. This was largely due to heavy Māori 
and Pacific Island dependency on unskilled wage labour, which the State had traditionally provided. 
When that work was cut back dramatically, Māori and Pacific Islanders suffered disproportionately 
and severely.79 Referring to June 1991 figures, Dalziel states:80 
The Household Labour Force survey unemployment rate for Māori was 27.1 per cent (the European rate 
was 7.7 per cent; the Polynesian rate was 28.6 per cent). It is not easy to imagine what having more than 
one in four workers unemployed does to a community, but for comparison, note that at the height of the 
Great Depression, the United States unemployment rate peaked at just under 25 per cent in 1933. That 
experience seared the psyche of the whole nation, and led to a range of institutional and policy reforms 
to prevent its recurrence. 
Income inequality grew, as did poverty.81 Between 1989 and 1992, "the number of New 
Zealanders estimated to be living below the [unofficial] poverty line rose by at least 35 percent."82 
As the number of people on benefits grew (almost doubling between 1984 and 1990), the value of 
benefits was reduced.83 In December 1990, the National Government announced "core benefit rate 
cuts of up to 25 per cent and tighter welfare eligibility rules [which] removed $1.275 billion from 
the social welfare budget in a full fiscal year".84 The Government implemented these changes 
  
noted that "restrictive economic and social policies" then in place had affected "the realization of economic, 
social and cultural rights, particularly of the most vulnerable groups of society."  
75  Kelsey, above n 69, at 24. 
76  Ibid, at 259. 
77  Ibid, at 173. 
78  Ibid, at 260. By 1994, unemployment had dropped back to 9.5 per cent.  
79  Ibid, at 283–284. 
80  Dalziel, above n 69, at 21.  
81  Kelsey, above n 69, at 271. 
82  Ibid, at 10. 
83  Ibid, at 273 and 279. 
84  Dalziel, above n 69, at 19 and 32. According to Bob Stephens ("Budgeting with the Benefit Cuts" in 
Jonathan Boston and Paul Dalziel (eds) The Decent Society? Essays in Response to National's Economic 
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despite advice that they would cause financial hardship and could intensify the economic recession 
then being experienced due to their impact on incomes and consumption.85 This impact was 
considerable, as "[b]eneficiaries in the bottom 20 percent [in terms of household income across the 
country] experienced a reduction of between 13 and 30 percent of disposable income."86  
Substantial cuts in education ($380 million) and health ($192 million) were also implemented.87  
In addition, the Government began to charge for services which it had previously provided for 
free, or to increase charges. This included fees for tertiary education, which were raised significantly 
in 1990.88 A result of this was reflected in New Zealand's second periodic report under the ICESCR, 
which referred to concern:89  
… that young people are emerging from the tertiary sector with high levels of debt. It has been argued 
that this high level of debt is contributing to high emigration levels of young graduates as wages in New 
Zealand are not sufficiently high to assist in student loan debt repayments. 
A considerable increase in social distress became evident. Between 1974 and 1990 the rate of 
male suicide rose by 288 per cent, "with the greatest increase in the late 1980s."90 Between 1991 
and 1993, the Salvation Army registered a 1,117 per cent rise in the use of its food parcel service.91 
Boston and Dalziel, writing in 1992, stated that "large numbers of disadvantaged New Zealanders 
[were having to] rely on voluntary agencies to satisfy their basic food and clothing needs",92 
something which they considered was unnecessary, and morally and socially unacceptable. They 
  
and Social Policies (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1992) 100 at 106 and 109), the tighter eligibility 
conditions for benefits generally came into effect from March 1991, while the cuts were implemented from 
1 April 1991. 
85  Stephens, above n 84, at 110–111. See also Dalziel, above n 69, at 32–33. 
86  Kelsey, above n 69, at 277. 
87  Chris Rudd "Controlling and Restructuring Public Expenditure" in Jonathan Boston and Paul Dalziel (eds) 
The Decent Society? Essays in Response to National's Economic and Social Policies (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1992) 39 at 39. 
88  Initial reports submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: New Zealand, above n 
65, at [656].  
89  Second periodic reports by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: New Zealand, above n 
65, at [570]. 
90  Kelsey, above n 69, at 295. 
91  Ibid, at 292. 
92  Jonathan Boston and Paul Dalziel (eds) The Decent Society? Essays in Response to National's Economic 
and Social Policies (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1992) i at ix. 
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further recorded that "not since the Great Depression has New Zealand witnessed such evidence of 
social deprivation and hopelessness, nor such high levels of unemployment."93 
C A Lack of Evidence-Based Policy 
In a range of areas, ideology rather than evidence seemed to be the significant driver in policy-
making. For example, writing in regard to the National Government elected in 1990, Boston and 
Dalziel considered that:94 
 … it appears that at least in some instances (e.g. housing and health care), decisions have been 
influenced too much by elegant, yet unproven, theories and too little by well-established practice or 
carefully designed experiments.  
In Boston's view, some of the "radical changes" in areas such as income support, health care, 
housing, and tertiary education were "founded neither on sound theory nor on sound empirical 
evidence."95 
D Lack of an Accountability Mechanism 
Theoretically, the principal way in which the Governments could be held accountable by those 
who disagreed with the reforms was through the ballot box. However, the 1980s and 1990s saw the 
failure of parliamentary democracy in New Zealand, with the parties in Government repeatedly 
breaking election promises.96 
  
93  At viii. 
94  At x. 
95  Jonathan Boston "Redesigning New Zealand's Welfare State" in Jonathan Boston and Paul Dalziel (eds) The 
Decent Society? Essays in Response to National's Economic and Social Policies (Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1992) 1 at 16. See also Kelsey, above n 69, at 277–278. 
96  See Kelsey, above n 69, at 37–38, 41 and 297–303 in relation to the 1984–1990 Labour Government:  
[Labour] had promised to maintain social services, but it cut them. It had promised to retain 
state assets, but it sold them. It had promised full employment, but it produced record 
unemployment. It had promised constitutional government and the rule of law, but it 
circumvented, overrode and treated with contempt the democratic processes of 
representation, participation and accountability.  
See Boston and Dalziel, above n 92, at x–xi in relation to the National Government that took over from 
Labour:  
Having won the 1990 election with an unprecedented majority, by late September 1991 
public support for the Government (as measured by national opinion polls) had shrunk to 
just over 20 per cent-lower in fact than that enjoyed by the fourth Labour Government in the 
months leading up to the 1990 election. The reasons for this rapid collapse in National's 
support are readily apparent. They include the party's failure to keep its election promises 
(especially with respect to superannuation, health care, and tertiary education), its failure to 
signal its radical policy agenda prior to the election, the lack of public consultation on the 
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This, and the severe consequences of the reforms for significant sectors of the population, led to 
"deep-seated scepticism about electoral politics and parliamentary democracy".97 In 1993, following 
a national referendum, the electoral system was changed from First Past the Post to a Mixed 
Member Proportional system. One of the main reasons for this was to reduce the likelihood of one 
of the two major parties being able to govern alone. In other words, its purpose was to place a 
restraint on State power, which many considered had been abused by Labour and National.98 
Accordingly, both before and after the NZBORA's enactment, the purpose of which is "to 
affirm, protect, and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in New Zealand",99 a series of 
retrogressive measures were taken which directly impacted upon the levels of realisation of New 
Zealanders' internationally recognised ESCR. However, the lack of free-standing ESCR in New 
Zealand law meant that there was little scope for challenging any of the reforms on a legal basis, 
despite the fundamental human rights interests at stake.  
The High Court's decision in Lawson v Housing New Zealand, which I now discuss, provides a 
useful example of this lacuna in New Zealand law and its effect.100   
  
nature of changes to be introduced, serious doubts about the merits of many of the planned 
changes, and the incompetence demonstrated in the handling of crucial issues such as 
superannuation and health care. 
97  Kelsey, above n 69, at 297. 
98  It is also not clear that the reforms produced their promised benefits. For example, Kelsey, above n 69, at 9, 
states that "between 1985 and 1992 total growth across OECD countries averaged 20 percent; New 
Zealand's economy shrank by 1 percent over the same period." In a 2006 comparison between the economic 
performance of Australia and New Zealand since 1984 (Hazledine and Quiggan, above n 71, at 145), the 
authors find that: 
[F]rom quite similar starting points the two countries pursued liberal reform programs that 
differed sharply … . Australia followed a more cautious, piecemeal, consensus-based 
approach, whereas New Zealand, in contrast, adopted a radical, rapid, 'purist' platform. The 
NZ reform package was generally seen by contemporary commentators as representing a 
'textbook' model for best practice reform. However, Australia since 1984 has performed 
much better than New Zealand, whose per capita GDP growth indeed ranked at or near the 
bottom of the OECD.  
Of course, the global economy over some of this period was volatile, particularly following the 1987 stock 
market crash. However, given that all OECD countries were subject to this volatility, it does not explain 
New Zealand's poor performance relative to other OECD members. For an opposing view, see Roger Kerr 
"No Time to Stop and Smell the Roses" The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 15 March 2005) 
cited in Hazledine and Quiggan, above n 71, at 150. 
99  NZBORA, long title. 
100  Lawson v Housing New Zealand and the Minister of Housing and the Minister of Finance HC Auckland 
M.538/94, 29 October 1996 [Lawson, unreported judgment]; and Lawson v HNZ, above n 4. I refer to both 
the unreported and reported judgments, as the reported judgment omits sections of the unreported judgment 
relevant to my analysis. 
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E Lawson v Housing New Zealand 
In this case, Mrs Lawson, a state housing tenant, sought judicial review of a series of decisions 
relating to the transfer of "state houses"101 to a company, Housing New Zealand Limited (HNZ), 
and the increase of the rent for those houses from subsidised to market rents. These reforms were 
implemented over a four year period beginning in 1991. 
1 The reasons for the reforms 
Prior to the reforms, rent subsidies for state house tenants were on average three times more than 
the assistance available to low-income private sector tenants. The Government considered that this 
was inequitable. Further, it was concerned that tenants could remain in state houses even if their 
financial situation improved. This was an issue because there was a significant waiting list for state 
houses, and on that list were people classified as being in "serious housing need" (that is, living in 
substandard or overcrowded housing, temporary accommodation, or housing costing over 50 per 
cent of their income).102 Access to adequate housing was also complicated by high private rents and 
high mortgage interest.103 
To address this situation, the Government decided to eliminate rental subsidies for state houses 
(that is, move to market rents), and decided instead to provide assistance through an accommodation 
supplement which would vary according to factors such as family size, income and locality. The 
subsidy would be set at a level to incentivise (or force) each tenant "to seek the most cost-effective 
accommodation"104 (for example, so that tenants without families but living in larger houses would 
move to smaller houses, freeing up those houses for other tenants with families).  
The principles informing the reforms included self-reliance, efficiency and greater personal 
choice.105 However, while funding cuts in health, education and social welfare had occurred in the 
1991 budget, the Minister of Housing deposed that the Government was not aiming for fiscal 
savings through the housing reforms, but rather the improvement of "efficiency and fairness".106 
Prior to the reforms' implementation, the Government was advised that the introduction of 
market rents would lead to a "major deterioration" in the living standards of many state house 
  
101  "State house" is the term generally used in New Zealand to refer to a house built and/or owned by the New 
Zealand State and rented to people on lower incomes as a form of social assistance. See further Lawson, 
unreported judgment, above n 100, at 3 and 5.  
102  Lawson, unreported judgment, above n 100, at 7. 
103  Ibid, at 5. 
104  Ibid, at 9. 
105  Ibid, at 6. 
106  Ibid, at 16. 
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tenants.107 The Government was also advised that many would have only a limited ability to change 
their accommodation (apparently due in part to an inadequate supply of low-cost housing, 
particularly one-bedroom units). Various strategies for easing the reforms' impact were 
recommended. They included staggered rent increases due to problems such as an insufficient 
supply of smaller units for tenants who could no longer afford their previous accommodation as a 
result of the increases, moving progressively rather than immediately to market rents, and 
reassessment of tenants during the introductory phase to determine which tenants required additional 
assistance. Most of these strategies were adopted. From the information available in the judgment, 
however, it appears that by 1995 HNZ had raised the rents of Mrs Lawson and most other state 
tenants to market levels.108 
2 The Lawsons and Mrs Lawson's application for review 
Mrs Lawson and her husband were elderly and her husband was in poor health. They had 
occupied the same state house in Onehunga, an Auckland suburb, for 49 years. As a result of the 
reforms, the rent payable by the Lawsons progressively increased from $81 per week in 1992 to a 
total of $165 per week in 1995 (an increase of just over 100 per cent). They were unable to pay the 
increased rate and, according to Mrs Lawson, alternative accommodation in the same area was only 
available at a higher rate. The Lawsons joined a rent strike, and HNZ ultimately sought to terminate 
their tenancy. Mrs Lawson then brought the application for review. 
Mrs Lawson pleaded, amongst other matters, that HNZ's decision to move to market rents 
breached her right to life (affirmed in s 8 of the NZBORA). She further alleged that, in setting the 
Government's social objectives for 1993 and 1994, and in not ensuring that HNZ charged affordable 
rents, the Ministers of Housing and Finance failed to have proper regard to her right to life and to 
New Zealand's international obligations, including its obligations under the ICESCR.  
3 The High Court judgment 
Williams J dismissed Mrs Lawson's application. The judge found that HNZ's decision to impose 
market rents was not amenable to judicial review. There was no evidence of fraud, corruption or bad 
faith, and HNZ's decision did not breach the Housing Restructuring Act 1992 (HR Act), the 
legislative vehicle for the housing reforms. According to Williams J, the decision to increase rents 
was "purely commercial".109  
The Judge further considered that if HNZ's decisions on rents were reviewable, it would be 
placed at a competitive disadvantage as against private landlords.110 The implication of Mrs 
  
107  Ibid, at 9. 
108  Ibid, at 36 and 37. 
109  Lawson v HNZ, above n 4, at 485. 
110  At 486. 
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Lawson's claim was that HNZ may have to charge less than the market could bear, while private 
landlords were not so restricted. If this were the case, HNZ's ability to operate as a successful 
business would be affected and the market distorted.111 Williams J also held that Mrs Lawson's 
complaint was that her rent had been increased, not that HNZ had failed to follow a necessary 
procedural step in making that increase. Accordingly, her claim concerned the merits of HNZ's 
decision rather than the process by which it was made. This meant that it was outside the legitimate 
scope of judicial review.112 
Williams J then turned to Mrs Lawson's claims against the Ministers. The Judge stated that the 
housing of lower income New Zealanders involved complex issues and was an area in which 
political judgements on the allocation of economic and social resources were required. Given this, in 
the absence of manifest unfairness relating to the procedure by which decisions about social housing 
were made, the Court would be less inclined to intervene. In Mrs Lawson's case, there was no 
procedural impropriety or inherent unfairness. Although Williams J recognised that the reforms had 
had "a seriously adverse effect on [Mrs Lawson's] financial position and on those who are similarly 
situated",113 the Judge also found that "any hardship which she experienced is insusceptible to 
judicial review."114 
In relation to Mrs Lawson's claim regarding the right to life, Williams J found that "an unduly 
strained interpretation" of the right would be required for it to apply to Mrs Lawson's 
circumstances.115 Further, even if the right were applicable, the Judge held that the reforms 
constituted a reasonable limit on the right under s 5 of the NZBORA, noting that "the provision of 
subsidised rental housing is no longer regarded as being as important in the public interest as was 
formerly the case."116 HNZ could not, according to the Judge, be expected to tailor its policies to 
each tenant's specific circumstances.  
The Judge also dismissed Mrs Lawson's allegation that the Ministers had not given proper 
regard to relevant international obligations. Williams J held:117 
[I]t is not for this Court to judge whether the government of New Zealand has fully complied with those 
obligations. It is sufficient for this Court to reach the view that the government has plainly made efforts 
  
111  Ibid. 
112  Ibid. 
113  Lawson, unreported judgment, above n 100, at 48. 
114  Lawson v HNZ, above n 4, at 487. 
115  At 495. 
116  At 495–496. 
117  At 498–499. 
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to balance the competing factors. Those efforts include the lengthy and detailed consideration of 
affordability and impact on living standards appearing in the reports earlier detailed and the changes to 
the accommodation benefit which accompanied them … . Whether New Zealand has fulfilled its 
international obligations is a matter on which it may be judged in international forums but not in this 
Court. …  
Though the shareholding Ministers do not say that they expressly took the international instruments into 
account, the aims of the international instruments are comparable with the principles which underpinned 
the housing reforms and informed their formulation and implementation. 
V THE ROLE ESCR COULD HAVE PLAYED 
In this Part, I consider the role that justiciable ESCR could have played in the context of the 
neoliberal reforms, specifically in Lawson v Housing New Zealand and also more generally. 
A Lawson v Housing New Zealand 
As Williams J pointed out, Mrs Lawson's claim was concerned with the effect of the increase to 
market rents on her and her husband's standard of living, and particularly on their housing. 
However, New Zealand law provided no express legal basis for an adjudication of that claim on its 
merits (that is, an inquiry into the consistency of the move to market rents with Mrs Lawson's 
internationally recognised legal interest, the right to adequate housing). 
If there had been a right to adequate housing (as set out in the ICESCR, including the 
prohibition against unjustifiable retrogressive measures) in the NZBORA or in other domestic 
legislation, the nature of the Court's inquiry would have been different. Critically, the Court would 
have had an express jurisdiction to determine whether HNZ's or the Ministers' decisions breached 
that right. I discuss below some of the issues that would have been justiciable if Mrs Lawson had 
been able to rely directly on such a right. 
1 Retrogressive measure 
The move to market rents constituted a retrogressive measure in relation to the right to adequate 
housing of numerous state tenants, and one which was apparently deliberate. As stated above, the 
Government knew that the reforms would result in a "major deterioration" in the living standards of 
many tenants.118 It was also advised before the reforms were implemented that "the most significant 
losers" would be current tenants.119 
That being the case, in accordance with the right to adequate housing as defined in the ICESCR 
(including the extent of permissible limitations), such a retrogressive measure had, amongst other 
  
118  Lawson, unreported judgment, above n 100, at 9. 
119  Ibid, at 11. 
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requirements, to be determined by law and not be incompatible with the nature of the right. Further, 
the Government was obliged to consider carefully all alternatives to that retrogression before 
implementing it, and to choose the least restrictive option available.  
If Mrs Lawson had been able to plead such a right before Williams J, the Court would have been 
required to examine whether the Government complied with these obligations. Such an inquiry 
could well have been significant.  
2 Determined by law? 
It is arguable that the move to market rents was not determined by law. Williams J found that 
nothing in the HR Act required HNZ to increase rents to market rates.120 Rather, the Government 
made the initial decision to increase rents as part of its 1991 Budget, and HNZ implemented the first 
two staggered increases as the Government's agent. HNZ then made the remaining increases up to 
market rates independently from Government, but knowing that the Government wanted it to do 
this.  
Williams J, however, held that the increases were "prescribed by law" in terms of s 5 of the 
NZBORA by applying a "pragmatic approach".121 The Judge apparently considered that while not 
specifically legislated for, it was within HNZ's discretion to make the increases given its obligation 
under s 4 of the HR Act to "operate as a successful business". Earlier in the judgment, Williams J 
had stated that:122 
… [HNZ's] decision to shift the rents for its houses to market rent and the means by which that was 
done, was a matter which lay within the discretion of the board acting in accordance with its statutory 
obligations and within the given objectives. … [HNZ] had the obligation to comply with its statute and 
the Crown's social objectives but it had the right, within that circumscribed field, to decide how to act.  
The finding that the increases were prescribed by law is questionable in light of the Judge's 
conclusion that the HR Act "does not refer to rent levels".123 That being the case, it is difficult to 
argue that the move to market rents was either "determined" or "prescribed" by the HR Act. The 
finding is also questionable given that, as well as obliging HNZ to operate as a successful business, 
s 4 of the HR Act required the company to "assist in meeting the Crown's social objectives by 
  
120  Lawson v HNZ, above n 4, at 484. 
121  Ibid, at 496. There is an issue about whether the phrases "determined by law" (the wording used in art 4 of 
the ICESCR) and "prescribed by law" (the wording used in s 5 of the NZBORA) have the same meaning. 
For the purposes of this analysis, however, I assume that there is no significant difference between the two.  
122  Lawson v HNZ, above n 4, at 485. Section 4(1) of the Housing Restructuring Act 1992 [HR Act] provided: 
"The principal objective of [HNZ] shall be to operate as a successful business that will assist in meeting the 
Crown's social objectives by providing housing and related services". 
123  Lawson v HNZ, above n 4, at 485. 
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providing housing". These "social objectives" included assisting "those on low incomes to obtain 
adequate and affordable accommodation" and that "[a]ccess to housing was not to be limited by 
personal factors including income."124 While Williams J considered that the rent increases were not 
inconsistent with these social objectives,125 this conclusion seems at odds with the Judge's finding 
that there was little doubt that the introduction of market rents had "a seriously adverse effect on 
[Mrs Lawson's] financial position and those who are similarly situated"126 and that the measures 
taken to ameliorate the impact of the new regime "have not come anywhere near fully compensating 
her for the increases in rent".127 It also appears at odds with the lack of a finding by the Judge 
against Mrs Lawson's contention that the charging of market rents had "resulted in her having 
inadequate housing".128 
Therefore, not only was there no express legislative direction that HNZ should increase rents to 
market rates, but (and as discussed in more detail below) those increases were arguably inconsistent 
with the social objectives that the HR Act obliged HNZ to assist in meeting.  
3 Alternatives considered? 
As well as the increases arguably not being determined by law, there is nothing in the judgment 
to indicate that the Government carefully considered all other alternatives to its policy before 
implementing it. For example, nothing is said about whether the Government considered providing 
at least some additional housing itself to meet the demand (and why it rejected that option); whether 
it considered less drastic options, such as requiring tenants who had large state houses to move to 
smaller ones if, for example, those tenants' families were no longer living with them; or whether it 
considered persisting with less severe measures that were already being undertaken prior to the 
reforms, such as requiring tenants who could pay market rates to do so.129 Alternative policy 
options existed, and the Government was not forced to move quickly because of, for example, 
resource limitations. As set out above, the reforms were not designed to produce savings. 
  
124  Ibid, at 484. 
125  Ibid, at 496. 
126  Lawson, unreported judgment, above n 100, at 48. 
127  Ibid, at 49. 
128  Lawson v HNZ, above n 4, at 479.  
129  See the Initial reports submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: New Zealand, 
above n 65, at [430], which states:  
Where tenants are able to pay market rates, they are charged accordingly. As at 31 March 
1989, about 7 per cent of the Corporation's tenants were paying market rates. The majority, 
however, are charged at a lower rate in accordance with their income.  
This report was before Williams J in Lawson v HNZ, above n 4. 
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Had the Government's consideration of alternatives been an issue in the proceedings, different 
evidence may have been led. However, it does appear from the judgment that the Government 
decided on the policy of moving to market rates, and that the evaluation after that point was 
exclusively concerned with the measures that would be required to implement the policy and 
ameliorate its effects. If this were in fact the case, it would have been arguable that the 
Government's approach failed to conform to another of the requirements of art 4 of the Covenant. 
4 Reforms incompatible with the nature of the right? 
In addition, had there been a justiciable right to adequate housing in New Zealand, a real issue 
would have arisen about whether the reforms were incompatible with the right of Mrs Lawson and 
others to such housing.  
The existence of such a right would not have meant that the rights of certain state house tenants 
would have always trumped the rights of others in need of housing (that is, that every tenant would 
have had an ongoing and inalienable right to the same standard of housing that they had prior to the 
reforms, no matter resource limitations or the needs of others); or that housing policy could never be 
changed. However, if the rights of some state tenants had to be restricted to achieve greater overall 
equity (such as requiring some tenants to move to smaller accommodation so that other people 
requiring larger state houses could be accommodated), such restrictions could not have been 
implemented in a way that effectively destroyed those tenants' rights.  
In the context of the reforms, this would have meant that the Government (or HNZ) would have 
had to ensure that, before state tenants were required to move from accommodation which was 
adequate, and before tenants were required to pay market rates for such accommodation, there was 
in fact adequate, alternative housing (even if not of the same standard) on offer from HNZ or from 
other landlords. In other words, a policy which arguably improved the position of at least some 
members of one disadvantaged group (private tenants), but also resulted in people who formerly had 
access to adequate housing no longer having such access (for example, falling into the category of 
serious housing need because they had to move to substandard housing or had to expend a large 
proportion or the majority of their income on accommodation), would be unlikely to be compatible 
with the right to adequate housing. 
Because Lawson v Housing New Zealand was not argued on this basis, it cannot be stated 
definitively that the Government knew that an effect of the reforms would be to push some tenants 
into inadequate housing, or whether that in fact happened. However, various facts in the judgment 
indicate that the Government was aware that this could occur, or at least did not have a solid factual 
basis for believing that it would not; and that some state tenants lost their former housing without 
any guarantee of an adequate replacement. 
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New Zealand's initial report under the ICESCR, drafted before the reforms were implemented, 
recorded that: "The main problems [in relation to housing] are the high cost in the private sector of 
houses and finances, or of rents, relative to income".130 The judgment of Williams J also recorded 
this understanding.131 In addition, policy advice to Government recognised that it was essential to 
the reforms' success that there was an adequate supply of low-cost housing.132 Despite this, there is 
nothing in the judgment to indicate that the Government determined prior to the reforms' 
implementation that there was such supply. Indeed, as the reforms proceeded, it was noted in 1992 
that there would be problems for tenants whose relocation options were constrained by a shortage of 
one-bedroom units.133 In 1994, one of the staggered rent increases was deferred due to a continuing 
shortage of smaller units.134  
Further, in 1993 the Chair of the HNZ Board wrote to the Prime Minister, advising him that a 
rent increase planned for November 1993 would particularly impact on approximately 9,000 retired 
persons, mainly women, who would generally not be able to find alternative accommodation. These 
people had in the past been the best tenants. The increase would result in their paying more than 40 
per cent, and in some cases more than 50 per cent, of their income on accommodation. The Chair 
advised the Prime Minister that this would cause "considerable individual distress".135 The 
Government, however, decided to proceed with the rent increase apparently without implementing 
any of the remedial strategies the Chair suggested, on the basis of advice that "the figures might 
have been overstated".136 
Therefore, the Government not only knew that the availability of adequate housing in the market 
was limited, but also knew that its reforms would force many tenants out of their current properties 
(indeed that was its intention) and simultaneously increase demand for smaller properties which 
were already oversubscribed. Despite this, the Government appears to have simply assumed that 
adequate housing would somehow be provided by a combination of market forces, HNZ, private 
landlords and the accommodation supplement. This assumption was apparently incorrect. Indeed, 
evidence before the Court (albeit contested) was that during the reforms the number of households 
  
130  Initial reports submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: New Zealand, above n 
65, at [415]. 
131  See Lawson, unreported judgment, above n 100, at 5. 
132  Ibid, at 7. 
133  Ibid, at 19. 
134  Ibid, at 21. 
135  Ibid, at 35 and 36. 
136  Ibid, at 36. 
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in serious housing need rose significantly. These households included state tenants who could not 
afford to pay their rent and tenants in private accommodation.137  
Apparently, one of these households was or was going to be the Lawsons'. As already stated 
above, there was no finding in the judgment against Mrs Lawson's allegation that the reforms had 
resulted in her having inadequate housing (in the sense that the rental increases had made her current 
housing unaffordable despite her and her husband taking measures such as doing without heating, 
that as a result they were subject to an application by HNZ to evict them, and that alternative 
accommodation in the same area was only available at a higher cost).  
5 Summary 
(a) Market rents: an apparently unjustifiable retrogressive measure 
The facts recorded in the judgment of Williams J provide clear indications that the move to 
market rents constituted an unjustifiable retrogressive measure, incompatible with the right to 
adequate housing of numerous tenants. It appears that the reforms may well have resulted in many 
tenants being moved from a situation in which they could enjoy the right to a situation in which the 
right was effectively negated (and accordingly breached). 
Mrs Lawson and her husband were some of the state tenants forced to move as a result of the 
implementation of market rents. Unfortunately, there is no indication in Williams J's judgment of 
what happened to the Lawsons following the termination of their tenancy for non-payment of rent, 
no doubt because, as Williams J found, any hardship which Mrs Lawson would experience as a 
result of the reforms was legally irrelevant.138 However, if the move to market rents meant that Mrs 
Lawson and her husband had to move out of their state house into substandard accommodation, then 
there would have been a clear argument that the Lawsons' right to adequate housing had been 
violated. From the information available from the judgment, that this could have occurred was 
clearly possible (unless Mrs Lawson and her ill husband, in their mid-70s and early 80s respectively 
at the time of the hearing, were able to find adequate housing outside the area in which they had 
lived for 49 years, or in another city). 
(b) A role for the courts, and determining the scope of the right 
Generally speaking, Williams J was correct in stating that a court should be reluctant to 
intervene in areas with high policy content. However, where there is evidence of considerable 
prejudice to people and indications that their rights (whether at international or domestic law) are 
  
137  Ibid, at 40–41. I note that it is not clear from the judgment how many of the latter were already in private 
accommodation and how many were in private accommodation as a result of being unable to pay rent for a 
state house. 
138  See Lawson v HNZ, above n 4, at 488, where Williams J found that any hardship Mrs Lawson experienced 
was "insusceptible to judicial review".  
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being breached by a certain policy, a substantive judicial review of the justifications for and 
proportionality of that prejudice, and of the measures taken to ameliorate it, should be available.  
Such a review will not necessarily lead to a finding that a particular measure is impermissible, 
and indeed a finding in favour of the measure will strengthen its legitimacy. In the case of the 
housing reforms, given their severe consequences for many state tenants, the ability to invoke a 
rights-based, substantive judicial review would have been entirely appropriate (whatever the 
outcome of such a review). It would also have been consistent with New Zealand's international 
obligation to protect the right to adequate housing.  
Further, a jurisdiction of this nature would not have required the Court to decide on the best way 
for the New Zealand Government to provide housing assistance. Rather, it would have simply 
permitted the Court to analyse the Government's reforms to ensure that they did not breach the right 
to adequate housing, affording the Government an appropriate margin of discretion.  
Of course, before a court could make such an assessment it would have to determine the scope 
of the right to adequate housing. This would be a function the court would be well-equipped to carry 
out. In making its determination, the court would be assisted by the parliamentary materials on the 
right (given that if a court had jurisdiction to make such a determination, that would be because the 
legislature had decided to make the right justiciable as a matter of domestic law), including relevant 
select committee reports, parliamentary debates, and other materials which would shed light on why 
Parliament had adopted a particular formulation of the right. The court could also be informed by 
expert evidence, the CESCR's General Comment on the right,139 other international definitions and 
associated jurisprudence and academic commentary: in other words, the same interpretative aids that 
courts already use in statutory interpretation, including but not limited to the interpretation of the 
rights affirmed in the NZBORA.140  
(c) Impact on policy 
Finally, if such a right had been expressly recognised in domestic law before the reforms were 
implemented, the Government would have been much more likely to take that right and its 
associated obligations expressly into account in policy design. Consequently, it would have been 
much more likely that the right would have influenced that policy. It is difficult to see how such an 
influence could be negative. While Williams J was correct to a point in considering that policy 
cannot be designed to meet individual circumstances, policy can and should be designed to be 
consistent with fundamental human rights, including ensuring that those rights are not breached as a 
result of its implementation. 
  
139  CESCR General Comment No 4 E/1992/23 (1991). 
140  See also in this regard Opie, above n 1, at 214–221. 
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6 Move to income-related rents regime 
It is noteworthy that in 2000, the Labour Government (which in 1999 replaced the National 
Government responsible for the reforms) moved to an "income related rents" regime for tenants of 
the successor to HNZ, the Housing New Zealand Corporation. Under the new regime "Corporation 
tenants pay no more than 25% of their income in rent, although minimum rents do apply".141   
The Lawsons' rent prior to the rent reforms was $75 a week, which was 25 per cent of their 
income.142 It is not clear whether they would have benefitted from the move back to income-related 
rents, some four years after their tenancy was ended because of their inability to pay the market rate. 
B Free-Standing, Justiciable ESCR: Awareness Amongst the Population 
and a Check on Power 
As set out above, from 1984 through until the late 1990s successive New Zealand Governments 
implemented a series of retrogressive measures with little or no mandate and apparently in some 
cases on the basis of scant evidence or analysis. These measures substantially affected the extent to 
which many people enjoyed ESCR in New Zealand and could have constituted violations of ESCR.  
At the same time, the New Zealand public appeared to be largely unaware that they had such 
rights as a matter of international law. As a matter of domestic law, and consistent with the intention 
of the Parliament which enacted the NZBORA, ESCR were not directly enforceable in New Zealand 
courts. Further, contrary to the Government's position (referred to in Part III above), ESCR were not 
adequately protected by other means. Lawson v Housing New Zealand provides a useful example of 
the significant limitations of judicial review where ESCR are concerned, and the difficulties created 
by the lack of an express jurisdiction for New Zealand courts to inquire into whether Government 
policy or legislation breaches ESCR. 
According to the White Paper, the purposes of the Bill of Rights it proposed included 
guaranteeing CPR, restraining the abuse of power by the State, acting as a source of inspiration, 
ensuring that individuals who suffered violations of their rights would receive remedies, and 
providing "a set of minimum standards to which public decision making must conform."143 Another 
  
141  See the Third periodic report submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: New 
Zealand, above n 60, at [406], which also states: 
Tenants with incomes above the New Zealand Superannuation low-income threshold will 
pay progressively more than 25 percent of their income, until the market rate is reached. 
Around 90 percent of Corporation tenants pay an income-related rent. 
142  Lawson, unreported judgment, above n 100, at 37. 
143  Palmer "White Paper", above n 28, at 5. 
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of its purposes was to educate New Zealanders about their rights. As the White Paper forcefully 
argued:144 
[The Bill of Rights] will be an important means of educating people about the significance of their 
fundamental rights and freedoms in New Zealand society. Citizens will have a readily accessible set of 
principles by which to measure the performance of the Government and to exert an influence on policy-
making. An awareness of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms amongst citizens and a desire to 
uphold them is as powerful a weapon as any against any Government which seeks to infringe them. In 
this way too, the Bill of Rights will be a powerful influence on the Government, its officials and 
agencies. 
All of these reasons for providing CPR with a special status in the NZBORA applied with equal 
force to ESCR (and continue to apply today). However, the omission of ESCR from the NZBORA 
meant that the Act was precluded from the outset from fulfilling any of the objectives listed above in 
relation to ESCR. As a result, ESCR were left exposed. 
Recognition of ESCR in the NZBORA could have had a number of important effects in relation 
to the reforms which occurred after its enactment in 1990. For example, as argued above in the 
context of Lawson v Housing New Zealand, Government would have been much more likely to take 
ESCR expressly into account in making policy and law, and affected individuals or representative 
organisations would have been able to invoke a substantive judicial review of Government policy 
that affected ESCR. In addition, there would have been an express statutory directive to interpret 
legislation consistently with ESCR where possible. 
The inclusion of ESCR in the NZBORA could have slowed the pace of the reforms;145 
tempered their severity by contributing to a more cautious approach from the outset; encouraged 
more robust and evidence-based policy;146 promoted ESCR through expressly requiring ESCR-
  
144  At [9.1]. 
145  Had justiciable ESCR had such an effect, it could have been beneficial. According to Hazledine and 
Quiggan, above n 71, at 152:  
… Australia's superior performance supports the view that the speed with which the New 
Zealand reforms were implemented contributed to poor observed outcomes. Excessive speed 
was problematic in itself, since it increased adjustment costs, and was frequently associated 
with poor implementation and a preference for dogmatism over practicality. 
146  In this regard, see Etienne Mureinik "Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution" 
(1992) 8 SAJHR 464 at 472–473, who argues as follows:  
[I]f the government is confident of the economic case [for any particular programme or 
policy], let it make it in court, where it can be exposed to scrutiny. If the government could 
adduce economic [and any other relevant] evidence and argument to make a plausible case, 
the court would have to uphold the programme. A central deficiency of the present order is 
that the economic case for a government programme, if it is made at all, is made at the level 
of slogan and newspaper headline, and, occasionally, at the not much less superficial level 
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consistent interpretations of legislation where such interpretations were open; and led to the 
identification of conduct that was inconsistent with ESCR (thereby protecting and upholding those 
rights). Justiciable ESCR could have provided an important and democratic check on the State's 
power, particularly given the context of democratic failure in which the reforms occurred. 
As the NZBORA is not supreme law, the inclusion of ESCR in it would not have prevented any 
Government from implementing reforms it deemed necessary. However, to the extent that such 
reforms were inconsistent with ESCR and were not prescribed by law, a court could have made a 
declaration to that effect. It would then have been up to the Government to modify its policies so as 
to make them ESCR-consistent, or to decide to override ESCR by enacting expressly inconsistent 
legislation (as the NZBORA permits). Courts would also have had the jurisdiction to indicate such 
legislative inconsistency.  
At each stage of the reforms, the Government would have had to consider directly the 
implications of any particular policy or law for the fundamental interests that ESCR represent, and 
the population would have had a set of internationally and domestically validated human rights 
standards against which to evaluate the Government's actions. Importantly, substantive judicial 
review could also have allowed for findings that measures which now appear, perhaps with the 
benefit of hindsight and on the basis of incomplete information, highly problematic with respect to 
ESCR were not in fact ESCR-inconsistent. 
VI CRITIQUE OF THE REASONS FOR OMITTING ESCR FROM 
THE NZBORA 
For the reasons set out above, there is a need for ESCR to have additional protection in New 
Zealand domestic law. The most obvious way of achieving this (at least as an initial measure) would 
be to incorporate these rights into the NZBORA and thereby provide them with the same status as 
CPR: that is, free-standing rights which directly influence statutory interpretation, law and policy-
making, that override inconsistent subordinate legislation and inconsistent policy, but give way to 
ordinary inconsistent legislation (and acts carried out or policy made pursuant to such legislation). 
  
permitted by the constraints of parliamentary procedure. Nothing requires the case to submit 
to searching scrutiny. Even if constitutional review of the kind suggested here proved to 
have no substantive bite at all – even, that is, if it resulted in the annulment of not a single 
programme – the procedural benefits would be immense. The knowledge that any 
government programme could be summoned into court for searching scrutiny would force its 
authors closely to articulate their reasons for dismissing the objections and the alternatives to 
the programme, and precisely to articulate the reasons that link evidence to decision, 
premises to conclusion. The need to articulate those reasons during decisionmaking would 
expose weaknesses in the programme that might force reconsideration long before the need 
arose for judicial challenge. 
See also Opie, above n 1, at 214–231. 
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Accordingly, it is important to analyse the reasons given in the White Paper and elsewhere for 
excluding ESCR from the NZBORA, and consider whether those reasons provide sufficient 
justification for not providing ESCR with the same status as CPR. In my view, they do not.  
A Policy, Not Right? 
Contrary to the argument in the White Paper, the inclusion of ESCR in the NZBORA would not 
involve the imposition or the freezing into place of a "temporarily popular view of policy."147 
1 ESCR are fundamental rights 
The preambles to the ICESCR and the ICCPR record the acknowledgement of States parties 
(including New Zealand) that both ESCR and CPR derive from the inherent dignity of the human 
person. Further, ESCR and CPR are indivisible and interdependent: as the preambles to the 
Covenants state, "the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be 
achieved if conditions are created whereby" all may enjoy their ESCR and CPR.  
Through its ratification of the Covenant, New Zealand has affirmed its values and accepted as 
binding upon it the obligations the Covenant imposes. So has the majority of the international 
community: 160 States including New Zealand are currently parties to the Covenant. The 
considerable degree of adherence to the Covenant demonstrates the wide and ongoing acceptance of 
its values and objectives.  
Accordingly, ESCR cannot be equated with "temporarily popular" policy. To the contrary, 
ESCR are fundamental human rights, of equal importance to CPR. 
2 Freezing in place a particular policy framework? 
As the CESCR has stated:148  
… in terms of political and economic systems the Covenant is neutral and its principles cannot 
accurately be described as being predicated exclusively upon the need for, or the desirability of a 
socialist or a capitalist system, or a mixed, centrally planned, or laisser-faire economy, or upon any other 
particular approach.  
Rather, "the rights recognized in the Covenant are susceptible of realization within the context 
of a wide variety of economic and political systems".149  
Therefore, the ICESCR does not make the use of a certain economic system or set of policies 
mandatory. Neither does it require States parties to adopt and maintain one set of policies 
  
147  Palmer "White Paper", above n 28, at [3.14]. 
148  CESCR General Comment No 3, above n 14, at [8]. 
149  Ibid, at [8]. 
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indefinitely. Indeed, such a course of action would be likely to frustrate ESCR realisation rather than 
promote it. 
3 Birthright 
Far from being passing considerations, the majority of the ESCR recognised in the ICESCR are 
what many New Zealanders would consider as their birthright and as part of the country's heritage.  
For example, the guarantee of access to decent health care and education regardless of one's 
ability to pay can be seen as a fundamental commitment in New Zealand. The same applies to 
adequate social security for those who cannot work (for reasons such as illness, disability, old age, 
or unemployment), and to access to employment for those who can work. At a more general level, 
one of the themes running through ESCR is equality, and this is a core New Zealand value. The 
White Paper itself referred to "the strong and long-standing emphasis on equality in New Zealand 
social and political thinking" and described it as a "central and paramount value [which] can be 
traced far back in our modern history and indeed can be discerned in the Treaty of Waitangi 
itself."150  
These commitments (for example, to suitable education, to adequate health care, and to equality) 
can be seen as constitutive, in that they form part of New Zealand's basic values.151 Given that, and 
as the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee recognised in 1988,152 they merit a place in New 
Zealand's constitutional law. 
It is also important to recall that the argument made in the White Paper against ESCR was in the 
context of the proposal to enact the Bill of Rights as supreme law. It has even less force in the 
  
150  Palmer "White Paper", above n 28, at [10.75]. See also CESCR General Comment No 20 E/C.12/GC/20 
(2009) at [3], which states:  
The principles of non-discrimination and equality are recognized throughout the Covenant. 
The preamble stresses the 'equal and inalienable rights of all' and the Covenant expressly 
recognizes the rights of 'everyone' to the various Covenant rights such as, inter alia, the right 
to work, just and favourable conditions of work, trade union freedoms, social security, an 
adequate standard of living, health and education and participation in cultural life. 
151  I have borrowed the idea of a "constitutive commitment" from Cass R Sunstein The Second Bill of Rights 
(Basic Books, New York, 2004) at 62. Sunstein uses this concept to describe rights which are not expressly 
set out in the Constitution of the United States, but nonetheless "have a special place in the sense that they 
are widely accepted and cannot be eliminated without a fundamental change in social understanding." These 
rights may be considered as "constitutive commitments" because they "help create, or constitute, a society's 
basic values", are "expected to have a degree of stability over time", and "[a] violation of them would 
amount to a kind of breach – a violation of a trust." 
152  "Justice and Law Reform Committee Final Report", above n 38, at 4. 
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context of the NZBORA as enacted, which does not override inconsistent legislation and can be 
amended by a simple majority.153  
B Positive ESCR vs Negative CPR, Judicial Capacity and Enforceability 
As set out in Part III above, another argument made in the White Paper against ESCR was that 
these rights create positive obligations on the State to provide for certain entitlements. Therefore, 
they are costly. CPR, on the other hand, impose principally negative duties, in that they simply 
require the State to refrain from certain acts. Accordingly, CPR are cost-free or very low cost.154  
As a result, the enforcement of CPR allegedly creates fewer issues for courts than the 
enforcement of ESCR. Rather than having to require the Government to expend taxpayer funds and 
potentially breach separation of powers principles (as ESCR allegedly require for their 
enforcement), CPR merely require the imposition of negative orders (for example, do not torture). 
As set out in Part III of this article, Geoffrey Palmer appeared to consider that if ESCR were 
justiciable rights in New Zealand, the judiciary would encroach on areas reserved for the executive 
and the legislature, and would be required to adjudicate upon social and economic issues in which 
they had insufficient expertise. 
In my view, these arguments are flawed. 
1 All rights have positive elements 
Contrary to the position advanced in the White Paper, CPR as well as ESCR have positive 
elements and rely upon publicly funded institutions to create the conditions in which they can be 
realised. The protection of CPR requires the taking of positive measures, including the enactment of 
legislation, monitoring, and enforcement.155  
For example, the electoral rights in s 12 of the NZBORA cannot be exercised in the absence of 
adequately supervised elections paid for with public funds. The minimum standards of criminal 
procedure set out in s 25 of the NZBORA, including the right to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial court, require the establishment and maintenance of a costly court system. 
The s 24(f) right of a person charged with an offence to receive legal assistance without cost "if the 
interests of justice so require", and if the person does not have access to sufficient funding, cannot 
  
153  See also in this regard Opie, above n 1, at 230–231. 
154  See also in this regard and for example EW Vierdag "The Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1978) 9 NYIL 69 at 81–82. 
155  See in this regard Stephen Holmes and Cass R Sunstein The Cost of Rights (WW Norton & Company, New 
York, 1999) at 44. 
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be realised in the absence of a legal aid system.156 The right of prisoners to be treated humanely and 
with respect for their dignity, as set out in s 23(5) of the NZBORA, requires significant expenditure 
to ensure that prison guards are adequately trained and minimum standards (for example, of 
cleanliness, medical care, and food) are maintained in prison.157 The protection of rights such as the 
right to property (not expressly guaranteed in the NZBORA but otherwise provided for in a range of 
other legislation) requires the ongoing funding of the courts, the police force and the prisons.158  
In New Zealand, as in many other jurisdictions, courts are empowered to award damages against 
the State for CPR breaches, and those damages have to be paid from public revenue. Further, to 
ensure the rights of prisoners "[c]ourts have ordered that prisons be built to relieve 
overcrowding";159 and judgments that States have unreasonably delayed bringing an accused to trial 
have placed "incentives on the state to increase the capacity of the judicial system by building new 
  
156  See also Malcolm Langford "The Justiciability of Social Rights: From Practice to Theory" in Malcolm 
Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law 
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008) 3 at 30. 
157  In "Reclaiming Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1993) 1 Waikato L Rev 141 at 152–153, Paul Hunt 
provides a table setting out the New Zealand Government's expenditure on various CPR. Although Hunt's 
table is not exhaustive and dates from 1993, it nonetheless illustrates that "the realisation of civil and 
political rights is neither a cost-free exercise nor one requiring only modest state expenditure." Hunt 
estimates a total expenditure of $213.32 million, including $59.51 million on "Administrative Services to 
Courts and Tribunals", $49.11 million on "Administration of Court Sentences of Imprisonment", and $6.60 
million on legal aid. More recently, a Capital Letter editorial (Penny Pepperell "Criminal Justice: Has the 
Tide Turned?" The Capital Letter (Auckland, 7 February 2012) at 1) recorded that between 2000 and 2011 
"spending on the justice system increased from $1.7 to nearly $4.0 billion." 
158  See further Holmes and Sunstein, above n 155, at 60–64 discussing the costs of property rights in the United 
States. Amongst other figures, the authors cite the following: "In 1992, direct expenditures in the United 
States for police protection and criminal corrections ran to some $73 billion". Note also a forecast of the 
current Minister of Finance, Bill English, that the Department of Corrections would become the largest 
government department in New Zealand by 2012 or 2013 in terms of the number of directly employed 
employees, outstripping the Ministry of Social Development and the Inland Revenue Department. This was 
because Corrections was going to have to employ more staff to cope with an expected increase in the prison 
muster. In addition, stating that the Ministry of Justice, the Police and Corrections would need "to find" 
$400 million from their existing budgets in the next three years to cope with the projected increase in the 
muster, the Minister warned that costs would continue to rise if more punitive justice measures were 
implemented. The Minister was quoted as stating:  
Every time you ask for harsher penalties, that shortfall gets bigger. You are part of the driver 
of the costs. Lock another person up that's another $90,000 (a year) plus another $250,000 
capital (spending). 
See Derek Cheng "Corrections to become monster department" The New Zealand Herald (online ed, 
Auckland, 2 July 2010). 
159  Craig Scott and Patrick Macklem "Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in 
a New South African Constitution" (1992) 141 U Pa L Rev 1 at 61. 
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courts and hiring extra judges and staff."160 Decisions upholding the right to due process have 
"increased the costs of administrative tribunals enormously."161 
Accordingly, courts often require the State to direct resources to the fulfilment of rights which 
cannot then be applied to other purposes. Indeed, in most jurisdictions with justiciable CPR, 
including New Zealand, such expenditure is required even in the absence of specific judgments: the 
State must expend resources to realise guaranteed CPR to reduce the risk of costly proceedings 
being brought against it. 
Finally, as Langford contends, while it may be argued that some ESCR require greater 
expenditure for their realisation than CPR, this is "a matter of degree rather than substance."162 
Indeed, the greater the amount of public funds involved, the greater the need for rigorous checks and 
balances, including a jurisdiction for the courts. 
2 Judicial capacity 
The argument that New Zealand judges do not have the capacity to adjudicate on ESCR is weak. 
First, as set out in Part III, they already adjudicate on aspects of these rights under legislation such 
as the HRA, the Employment Relations Act, the Holidays Act, and the Accident Compensation Act. 
Second, while the enactment of ESCR in New Zealand law as justiciable rights would require 
judges to develop greater knowledge about these rights, this task would not be beyond them. Judges 
are often required to deal with new areas of law; indeed, the NZBORA was novel when it was first 
enacted. Third, if a wider range of expertise were thought desirable for ESCR cases, the presiding 
court could be comprised of not only judges but also lay people with relevant expertise,163 as 
already occurs under the HRA164 and in litigation under the Commerce Act 1986.165 As in any 
case, expert witnesses could also be called to assist.  
  
160  Ibid, at 48. See further Scott and Macklem's discussion of judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights regarding the obligations of the State to ensure the timely administration of justice (both in civil and 
criminal settings) at 48. 
161  Ibid, at 50. 
162  Langford, above n 156, at 30–31. 
163  See also in this regard Smillie, above n 43, at 194. 
164  Section 126 of the HRA states that in certain cases, matters brought to the High Court under the HRA must 
be heard by a High Court judge and two additional persons appointed from a panel selected by the Minister 
of Justice in accordance with s 101 of the HRA (as occurred in CPAG v AG, above n 63). The members of 
the panel, who do not all have to be lawyers, are also eligible to serve on the HRRT. In selecting the panel, s 
101 requires the Minister to have regard to:  
… the need for persons included on the Panel to have between them knowledge of, or 
experience in,— 
(a) different aspects of matters likely to come before the Tribunal: 
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The White Paper stated that, in enforcing the supreme law Bill it proposed, the courts:166 
 … would be exercising, in part in an enhanced way, their historic constitutional role of protecting the 
individual, especially the weak, the disadvantaged, the member of an unpopular minority, against the 
State.  
The role of the courts under the NZBORA is less than what it would have been under a supreme 
law Bill, but it still conforms with this characterisation. Indeed, this role may be seen as one of the 
courts' core functions. If New Zealand courts were given jurisdiction over enforceable ESCR, this 
core function would be extended but not substantially modified.167 
It was also argued in the White Paper that, under a Bill of Rights:168  
… [t]he courts will have a role. It will be a crucial one but it will not be an exclusive one. The Bill of 
Rights should be thought of as providing a floor. The life of the state can and should rise far above it.  
There is no reason why ESCR and the role of the courts in relation to these rights could not have 
been or could not now be conceptualised in the same way. 
Finally, it is likely that if ESCR were recognised as free-standing rights in New Zealand, the 
involvement of the courts in issues formerly designated as wholly political would increase. 
However, for the reasons set out above, a greater role for the New Zealand courts in relation to the 
protection of ESCR is desirable.169  
  
(b) New Zealand law, or the law of another country, or international law, on human rights: 
(c) public administration, or the law relating to public administration: 
(d) current economic, employment, or social issues: 
(e) cultural issues and the needs and aspirations (including life experiences) of different 
communities of interest and population groups in New Zealand society.  
165  See the Commerce Act 1986, ss 77 and 78. Section 77 requires amongst other matters that a person 
appointed as a lay member under the Act be "qualified for appointment by virtue of that person's knowledge 
or experience in industry, commerce, economics, law, or accountancy." 
166  Palmer "White Paper", above n 28, at [3.10]. 
167  For example, the courts would have an express jurisdiction to inquire into whether benefit cuts violated the 
rights of beneficiaries (a weak, disadvantaged and often unpopular group) to adequate food, clothing and 
housing and to social security more generally. 
168  Palmer "White Paper", above n 28, at [4.5]. 
169  In this regard, note also the following comment by Lord Steyn in "Deference, a Tangled Story" [2005] PL 
346 at 357 (cited in CPAG v AG, above n 63, at [142]):  
Most legislation is passed to advance a policy. And frequently it involves in one way or 
another the allocation of resources. … What I am saying is that there cannot be a legal 
principle requiring the court to desist from making a judgment on the issues in such cases. … 
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3 ESCR: unmanageable, unenforceable or incapable of judicial resolution? 
There is no evidence that ESCR suffer from such inherent defects. ESCR are recognised as 
justiciable rights in, for example, the Brazilian, South African and Finnish Constitutions, and the 
courts have decided a wide range of cases involving these rights. The judgments of these courts 
demonstrate that ESCR do not make a Bill of Rights or a constitution unmanageable. To the 
contrary, the constitutionalisation of ESCR in Brazil, South Africa and Finland has provided an 
important check on the powers of the legislature and executive, and a critical source of protection 
for people who have not otherwise been well served by democratic processes. 
For example, the right to health recognised in the Brazilian Constitution has provided the 
foundation for a large number of court rulings requiring that indigent HIV sufferers be provided 
with free medication. The constitutional right to free preschool education has also been used to force 
State authorities to provide that education to children from low-income families. The South African 
Constitutional Court's judgment in Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and 
Others (No 2),170 based on the constitutional right to access to health services, required the State to 
remove unreasonable restrictions on the availability in the public health sector of a drug used to 
prevent the transmission of HIV from mother to child. The Finnish courts and the Finnish 
Constitutional Law Committee have applied the social security rights guaranteed in the Finnish 
Constitution to prevent the State denying the minimum benefits necessary for a dignified life to 
groups who could not provide for themselves.171 Without the courts, the beneficiaries of these 
judgments (and in the case of Finland, of the Constitutional Law Committee's opinions) would have 
had no remedy. 
  
There is in my view no justification for a court to adopt an a priori view in favour of 
economic conservatism. In common law adjudication it is an everyday occurrence for courts 
to consider, together with principled arguments, the balance sheet of policy advantages and 
disadvantages. It would be a matter of public disquiet if the courts did not do so. Of course, 
in striking the balance the courts may arrive at a result unacceptable to Parliament. In such 
cases Parliament can act with great speed to reverse the effect of a decision. … But there is 
no need to create a legal principle requiring the courts to abstain from ruling on policy 
matters or allocation of resource issues. 
170  Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2), above n 44.  
171  For summaries of ESCR cases under the Brazilian, Finnish and South African Constitutions, see Opie, 
above n 1, chs 3 (at 96–103), 4 (at 133–136) and 5 (at 165–187). For a discussion of the role of the Finnish 
Constitutional Law Committee and its ESCR-related opinions, see Opie, at 126–128 and 136–138. 
510 (2012) 43 VUWLR 
It is also arguable that the inclusion of ESCR has increased the legitimacy and relevance of the 
Brazilian, South African and Finnish Constitutions.172 Indeed, most national constitutions now 
affirm ESCR.173 
Further, if the New Zealand Parliament considered that the terms in which ESCR are expressed 
in the ICESCR are insufficiently precise or unsuited to the New Zealand context, there would be 
nothing preventing Parliament from enacting the rights in the NZBORA in different terms to those 
used in the ICESCR (provided that such rights were not inconsistent with those set out in the 
ICESCR).174 The Finnish, South African and Brazilian Constitutions are precedents for such an 
approach. For example, rather than guaranteeing a right to the "highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health", as in art 12 of the ICESCR, the right referred to in s 19(3) of the 
Finnish Constitution is to "adequate social, health and medical services." Similarly, s 27(1) of the 
South African Constitution is limited to affirming the right to "access to health care services." In the 
  
172  Ibid, at 115–118, 149–153 and 202–203. In relation to South Africa, note Nicholas Haysom 
"Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and Socio-Economic Rights" (1992) 8 SAJHR 451 at 454, who 
argues:  
[F]or a constitution to have a meaningful place in the hearts and minds of the citizenry, it 
must address the pressing needs of ordinary people. It cannot be seen to institutionalise and 
guarantee only political/civil rights … it must promise both bread and freedom. If it does not 
do so, it will find no lasting resonance amongst the true guardians of the constitution – which 
are not the courts but the citizens (emphasis in original). 
173  See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton The Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2009) at 28. With reference to their database, which includes data on every 
national constitution written since 1789, the authors state:  
As is well-known, the menu of 'required' rights has expanded dramatically since the days 
when the negative rights enshrined by the U.S founders seemed complete. Second and third 
generation rights, the positive rights, are now included in international covenants as well as 
most national constitutions (emphasis added).  
Note however that the authors do not provide any information on the extent to which such rights are 
justiciable in the national constitutions to which they refer (as opposed to being, for example, unenforceable 
directive principles). See further Opie, above n 1, at 247–249. 
174  For more detail, see Opie, above n 1, chs 3, 4, and 5. Note also in this regard that neither the Bill of Rights 
as originally proposed in the White Paper nor the NZBORA as ultimately enacted followed the drafting 
used in the ICCPR. As stated in Palmer "White Paper", above n 28, at [10.10]–[10.12], while the Bill was 
said to be consistent with the ICCPR, it was also noted that: 
… the text of the Bill departs considerably from that of the [ICCPR] both in phraseology and 
arrangement. In some respects the language of the [ICCPR] appears too detailed or unsuited 
to a New Zealand statute. It was fashioned to meet the varying circumstances of all countries 
that participated in drawing it up. A number of its provisions have little relevance to the 
situation in New Zealand. Consequently, many of the Articles of the [ICCPR] have no 
corresponding provision in the Bill of Rights. 
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Brazilian Constitution, and in contrast to the ICESCR, none of the affirmed "social rights" are 
subject to progressive realisation: all are required to be immediately guaranteed.  
Finally, if Parliament considered that additional guidance should be given to the courts about the 
content of ESCR, elements of these rights could be particularised in the NZBORA. This was the 
course Parliament took in relation to some of the CPR affirmed in the NZBORA. For example, 
rather than simply affirming the right to a fair trial and nothing more, s 25 of the NZBORA sets out 
"minimum standards of criminal procedure". These minimum standards include the right to a fair 
and public hearing by an independent and impartial court; the right to be tried without undue delay; 
and the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law.175 There is no reason 
why such minimum standards could not also be devised in respect of ESCR (for example, for the 
rights to adequate housing, social security or education). 
C Unrealistic Expectations? 
As set out above, Palmer considered that "to state as fundamental rights matters which it was not 
within the power of government to deliver would cause expectations to rise, only to be dashed."176 
In New Zealand, however, the State should be in the position to guarantee most if not all of these 
rights. If it is not, then this would only add strength to the argument that the legal status of such 
rights should be enhanced by enacting them in the NZBORA, but perhaps subject in some cases 
(such as the right to adequate housing) to progressive realisation, as in the Covenant.177 This would 
assist in ensuring that the Government prioritises their realisation over less fundamental interests. 
  
175  Section 25 of the NZBORA also affirms the following rights:  
(d) The right not to be compelled to be a witness or to confess guilt:  
(e) The right to be present at the trial and to present a defence:  
(f) The right to examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to obtain the attendance and 
examination of witnesses for the defence under the same conditions as the prosecution:  
(g) The right, if convicted of an offence in respect of which the penalty has been varied 
between the commission of the offence and sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser 
penalty:  
(h) The right, if convicted of the offence, to appeal according to law to a higher court against 
the conviction or against the sentence or against both:  
(i) The right, in the case of a child, to be dealt with in a manner that takes account of the 
child's age. 
176  Palmer New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis, above n 41, at 57. 
177  See Opie, above n 1, at 258–275, for a version of the NZBORA amended to include a range of ESCR and a 
discussion of the suggested amendments. 
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D Mandatory Relevant Considerations and the Presumption of 
Consistency: Sufficient Protection for ESCR through the Common 
Law? 
As set out in Part III above, the New Zealand Government's position has been that it is 
unnecessary to include ESCR in the NZBORA as they are adequately protected by other means, 
including through the common law.178 As briefly discussed in Part III, two common law 
mechanisms which are relevant in this regard are the administrative law requirement that decision-
makers exercising statutory powers of decision take into account all mandatory relevant 
considerations; and the common law presumption of statutory interpretation that "so far as its 
wording allows legislation should be read in a way that is consistent with New Zealand's 
international obligations".179  
For the reasons set out below, however, neither mechanism provides sufficient protection for 
ESCR. 
1 Mandatory relevant considerations 
A decision-maker exercising a statutory power of decision which affects ESCR may well be 
required to take into account New Zealand's obligations under the ICESCR (provided this is not 
expressly or impliedly excluded by the relevant statute).180 As set out above, one of Mrs Lawson's 
pleadings in Lawson v Housing New Zealand was advanced along these lines.181  
  
178  See Initial reports submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: New Zealand and 
Second periodic reports by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: New Zealand, above n 
65. 
179  New Zealand Air Line Pilots' Association Inc v Attorney- General [1997] 2 NZLR 269 (CA) at 289. Note 
also Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104 at [24] and [32], in which Tipping 
J characterised the presumption as follows:  
This construction [of s 47(3) of the Immigration Act 1987] gives effect to the principle that 
Parliament has legislated consistently with international obligations unless the contrary is 
clearly shown or unless the language used does not allow that outcome (emphasis added).  
For a detailed analysis of the presumption see Claudia Geiringer "Tavita and All That: Confronting the 
Confusion Surrounding Unincorporated Treaties and Administrative Law" (2004) 21 NZULR 66 at 75.  
180  See, for example, Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257 (CA) at 266, cited in Lawson v 
HNZ, above n 4, at 497. See also Geiringer, above n 179, at 73–74. 
181  Note however that Mrs Lawson's pleading was that the Ministers of Housing and Finance failed to have 
proper regard to New Zealand's obligations under the ICESCR (that is, an allegation not of a complete 
failure to have regard to these obligations, but an allegation that the regard had was insufficient). For the 
reasons set out in Parts IV and V above, Williams J did not uphold this allegation. Note also (and in any 
case) Geiringer's reference to "the blindness of the mandatory relevant considerations model to questions of 
weight or justification": Geiringer, above n 179, at 89–90.  
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The principal weakness of such a requirement, however, is that even where it applies, the 
decision-maker only has to take into account the relevant obligations. Having done that, he or she 
may choose to make a decision which is inconsistent with the ICESCR.182 While having to consider 
such obligations may affect the decision in question (including swinging it in favour of an ESCR-
consistent outcome), it also may not. 
A further (and counter-intuitive) difficulty with the model is that the courts may find that a 
decision-maker has met the requirement to have regard to relevant ICESCR obligations even where 
he or she has not expressly considered those obligations. As set out in Part IV above, in Lawson v 
Housing New Zealand Williams J found that the Ministers had not expressly taken the ICESCR into 
account, but also found that:183 
… [the] law does not appear to require Ministers to give specific consideration to such instruments [the 
ICESCR and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights] so long as they inform the decision-making 
process.  
Williams J considered that that had occurred. Therefore, the Ministers had in effect, even if not 
in fact, had regard to the relevant obligations.184 
Accordingly, the mandatory relevant considerations model provides, at best, very limited 
protection for ESCR.  
2 Presumption of consistency 
As far as I am aware, the presumption of consistency has not been raised in any case before the 
New Zealand courts in which the ICESCR has been cited. It is, however, potentially a more potent 
instrument for protecting ESCR than the mandatory relevant considerations model. On the basis of 
  
182  Geiringer, above n 179, at 83–84. 
183  Lawson v HNZ, above n 4, at 498. 
184  See also Ankers v Attorney-General [1995] 2 NZLR 595 (HC) at 601–602, in which Thorp J adopted a very 
similar approach to Williams J. In this case, the applicant alleged amongst other matters that in making 
directions relating to the granting of special benefits, the Minister of Social Welfare failed to take into 
account New Zealand's obligations under arts 2(1), 9, 10 and 11 of the ICESCR. Thorp J found that officials 
of the Department of Social Welfare had not specifically referred the Minister to the Covenant obligations 
when he made the directions, but that it was "totally improbable" that "the Minister would be unaware of the 
tension between the type of restructuring of income support for the less advantaged which the government 
was undertaking and its international obligations". Thorp J also found that the Minister was not referred to 
the obligations because the officials considered that the directions would not conflict with them. On the 
basis of those findings, and also citing authority that the collective knowledge of departmental officials was 
to be treated as the knowledge of the relevant minister, Thorp J dismissed the allegation that the Minister 
had failed to take into account the relevant ICESCR obligations (although ultimately found in the applicant's 
favour on other grounds). 
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this presumption, it could be argued that where such an interpretation is open, legislation affecting 
ESCR should be read consistently with New Zealand's obligations under the ICESCR. 
For example, in Lawson v Housing New Zealand, it could have been argued that the scope of 
HNZ's authority or discretion to act (as principally defined by s 4 of the Housing Restructuring Act, 
which required HNZ to operate as a successful business that would assist in meeting the Crown's 
social objectives) had to be interpreted consistently with New Zealand's obligations under the 
ICESCR. On such an interpretation, the HR Act would have impliedly required HNZ not to take any 
action or omit to do any act which would result in New Zealand violating its obligations under the 
ICESCR; or put another way, that HNZ's discretion to act was limited to actions consistent with 
New Zealand's obligations under the ICESCR, including the obligation to respect the right to 
adequate housing.  
If that interpretation of HNZ's powers and obligations had been accepted, together with an 
argument along the lines set out above that HNZ's decision to charge market rents was incompatible 
with the right to housing under the ICESCR, it would have been strongly arguable that the decision 
was unlawful.185 Accordingly, if the presumption of consistency had been raised in Lawson v 
Housing New Zealand, and if Williams J had been persuaded to interpret the HR Act in this way, 
perhaps it could have affected the outcome of the case.186  
However, while the presumption could perhaps have assisted in Lawson v Housing New 
Zealand, and may assist in future ESCR litigation, it is not enough.  
Because ESCR are fundamental rights, they should be expressly affirmed in the NZBORA. A 
common law presumption of statutory interpretation in favour of ESCR is at best (and if in fact 
applied by the courts) an indirect, limited and potentially convoluted way of giving some effect to 
these rights in domestic law. As has already been recognised in the case of CPR, such a presumption 
is no substitute for the enactment of ESCR in the NZBORA as freestanding, enforceable rights 
  
185  This argument assumes that the presumption of consistency could apply in interpreting HNZ's obligations 
and powers under the HR Act, even though HNZ was a company incorporated under the Companies Act 
1955 rather than, for example, a public sector agency. Generally speaking, a court would be less likely to 
hold that the presumption applied to legislation concerning the rights and obligations of private rather than 
public entities. However, in Lawson v HNZ, above n 4, at 493, and while not expressing a concluded view, 
Williams J considered that the NZBORA appeared to apply to HNZ's implementation of the market rent 
policy (in terms of s 3(b) of the NZBORA, being an act by a body in the performance of any public 
function, power, or duty conferred on that body by or pursuant to law). If the NZBORA applied to HNZ, 
there would seem to be no reason why the presumption of consistency could not also apply to HNZ's 
empowering legislation. 
186  Similarly, it could perhaps also have been argued that given New Zealand's obligations under the ICESCR 
in relation to housing, the injunction to HNZ in the HR Act to act as a successful business had to give way 
to the requirement to assist in meeting the Crown's social objectives in relation to housing, where those two 
conflicted (or more generally where acting as a successful business would conflict with the right to adequate 
housing as defined in the ICESCR).  
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(included in the express statutory direction in s 6 of the NZBORA to the courts to interpret 
legislation consistently with the affirmed rights where possible, and coming within the Attorney-
General's reporting obligations under s 7). 
Also, given Parliament's express intention not to include ESCR in the NZBORA when it was 
enacted, the courts could be exposed to allegations of attempting to import these rights through the 
backdoor if, for example, they used the presumption of consistency to require that statutory powers 
be exercised in a manner consistent with ESCR.187 This, combined with the courts' traditional 
reluctance to adjudicate in areas of social and economic policy,188 could mean that courts would be 
inclined to take a hands-off approach in deciding whether the ICESCR obligations had been 
complied with in a particular case (for example, by giving the relevant decision-maker a very broad 
margin of discretion); to interpret narrowly the scope of those obligations; or to decide that there 
was no room in the particular statutory scheme for the presumption to apply. On the other hand, 
affirming ESCR expressly in the NZBORA would ensure that there could be no doubt about the role 
the courts should take in relation to ESCR: the same role as they now have in relation to the 
affirmed CPR.189  
Finally, the presumption does nothing to address the unequal status that ESCR have in relation 
to CPR in New Zealand domestic law. Unless ESCR are recognised in the NZBORA, they are likely 
to continue to have little impact on New Zealand law and to remain little known by the New 
Zealand public. Conversely, an affirmation of ESCR in the NZBORA would considerably increase 
their visibility and relevance, for the New Zealand public in general, and also for officials, decision-
makers, legislators, lawyers, and judges. It would, in Palmer's words, provide another "set of 
navigation lights for the whole process of government to observe".190 It would also allow the New 
  
187  See in this regard Geiringer, above n 179, at 77. 
188  See in this regard Lawson v HNZ, above n 4, at 487–488 and 494–496. See also Geiringer and Palmer, 
above n 57, at 37, who state that: 
New Zealand courts have expressed a general reluctance to bring their judicial review 
powers to bear in the area of socioeconomic entitlement because of the 'political' nature of 
social policy questions.  
189  In this regard, note Miller J's judgment in Attorney-General v Human Rights Review Tribunal and Child 
Poverty Action Group Incorporated (2006) 18 PRNZ 295 (HC) (dismissing the Attorney-General's claim 
that CPAG lacked standing to bring the proceedings before the HRRT referred to in n 63 above). At [64]–
[65], Miller J stated: 
[T]he proposition that the Courts have no business adjudicating upon claims that have 
serious resource allocation implications for the community has a very respectable pedigree. 
… By admitting claims of discrimination [under the HRA] in respect of enactments, 
however, Parliament has made available a cause of action and a forum in which such claims 
may be publicised and to some degree vindicated, if not actually remedied. In other words, 
the legislation manifestly admits [such] claims. 
190  Palmer "The Bill of Rights Fifteen Years On", above n 42, at [38]. 
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Zealand judiciary to develop a national jurisprudence on these rights, as they have done for the CPR 
set out in the NZBORA.  
E Summary 
There is no compelling justification for the omission of ESCR from the NZBORA. Conversely, 
their inclusion in that instrument would provide a necessary and express restraint on Government's 
power. It would also be consistent with ESCR's status as fundamental human rights.191 
VII CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the New Zealand Government's current position, the common law and existing 
legislation do not provide sufficient protection for ESCR in New Zealand. While politicians should 
be primarily responsible for social and economic policy, the experiences of the 1980s and 1990s 
demonstrate that there is a role for the judiciary. What appear to be violations of ESCR have 
occurred in New Zealand, and New Zealanders should have been able to test these apparent 
violations in court. They should now be expressly empowered to take proceedings in respect of any 
future Government action or omission which appears ESCR-inconsistent.  
New Zealand has recognised ESCR as fundamental human rights in the international sphere, and 
ESCR have no inherent defect which means that they cannot be recognised domestically as 
justiciable rights. The most obvious way for this to occur is to incorporate them into the NZBORA. 
If CPR are not to be left to politics (or to trust), neither should ESCR. 
  
191  For an argument against recognising ESCR as fundamental human rights (including that they are "inimical 
to a free society" and incompatible with the right to property), see Bernard Robertson "Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Time For A Reappraisal" (September 1997) New Zealand Business Roundtable 
<www.nzbr.org.nz>. For a critique of some of the positions taken by Robertson, see Opie, above n 1, at 31–
32 and 211–214. 
